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Abstract

Determining and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not be
consistent with the usual skills/knowledge and training of accounting auditors.
Indeed, recent studies, Rezaee et al, 2016 and Wright & Zimbelman, 2015, have
shown that auditors are usually unsuccessful assessors of fraud risk valuations.
Same conclsion was also drawn by previous studies: Cushing et al., 1995;
Nieschwietz et al., 2000; Allen et al., 2006. However, forensic auditors may be
skilled enough to make up for such limitations. Therefore, the aim of this study
was to discover the level of forensic accounting skills among government auditors
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and how these skills may affect their
performance in fraud risk valuation. The study also examined the role of mental
representation in connecting forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.
This study is the first in the context of Dubai to examine how different forensic
accounting skills affect the fraud-related judgment of government auditors. This
study adds to knowledge concerning differences in fraud risk task performance
between forensic accounting auditors and accounting auditors, and considers how
accounting auditors’ approach to fraud might be improved by adopting forensic
accounting skills. Moreover, this study enriches the literature by highlighting
fraud-related mental representations as a possible intermediate stage of forensic
accounting skills used in fraud risk valuation. The outcomes of this study provide
practical evidence that auditors' fraud risk valuation capability can be improved
via the implementation of forensic accounting skills. The results suggest that
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills assessed greater fraud
risk in both the high and low fraud risk scenarios than government auditors with
low forensic accounting skills.

Government auditors with high forensic
3

accounting skills developed a mental representation that was different from
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. Lastly, the relationship
between auditors’ forensic skills and fraud risk valuation is direct and there is no
support for a mediation. It was recommended that there is a need for advance
training for accounting auditors in forensic accounting skills.

Keywords
Fraud, Forensic accounting skills, Accounting auditors, Government auditors, Fraud risk
valuation, Fraud triangle, Fraud Diamond Theory, Financial Audit Department, Dubai.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Fraud risk valuation assists an auditor in defining the nature and level of the audit
events intended to raise the likelihood of fraud exposure (Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges,
2011). Consequently, fraud risk valuations help auditors to determine the procedures
that are necessary to perform an audit or investigation (Gerson et al., 2006). However,
previous studies have revealed that accountants are usually poor evaluators of fraud
risk valuation, because fraud detection is not their main training (Allen et al., 2006;
Asare et al, 2015).
In a major experiment, Boritz et al. (2008), investigated whether fraud experts
such as forensic accountants are more skilful than accountants in discerning deception
during an audit. The results of his study suggested that forensic accountants are better
able than accountants to notice fraud, particularly when there is a major threat of
dishonesty. A recent study of the connection between the knowledge and mentality
of forensic auditors concerning fraud risk valuation, discovered that forensic auditors
have advanced levels of knowledge, a more appropriate mentality, and better fraud
risk valuation than accountants in the areas of fraud anticipation/deterrent, discovery,
and response (Popoola, 2015).
To the best knowledge of author, no other research has examined the relationship
of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk valuation and the possible role of mental
representation in this relationship in the context of Dubai. Whilst it has been reported
that forensic auditors have a higher information and mind set than accountants during
mission performance (Boritz et al. 2008; Chui, 2010; Popoola, 2015), it remains
unclear whether the same can be said for government auditors who have acquired
forensic accounting skills. Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore whether
13

there was a substantial difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation
of government auditors with low and high forensic accounting skills. The study also
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation by government auditors.
1.2 Motivation and Need for the Study
Fraud and corruption have been highlighted as main concern of economies and
countries over the past 25 years, since the Enron scandal. In addition, enhancing skills of
auditors and investigators have become a major prerequisite for prospers economies.
The researcher is a police officer working in the field of forensic accounting and
has more than 15 years of working experience with government auditors to detect and
combat fraud. The personal motivation for this study is the observation that there might
be a gap in forensic accounting skills among government auditors. Therefore, the
researcher set out to inspect forensic accounting skills among government auditors in
Dubai and to examine in what way these skills affect their performance in fraud risk
valuation. Further, numerous researchers have called for further research into the area of
forensic accounting to understand the exposure of fraud in organisations (Baron, 2006;
Baird and Zelin, 2009; Covaleski 2003; Wells, 2005; Gottschalk, 2010).
1.3 Problem Statement
Lately, a sequence of frauds has been detected both within the public sector and
in the private sector of the economy. A study conducted by PWC entitled “Economic
Crime in the UAE” found that 27% of the UAE respondents reported economic crime
within their organizations, a figure that is significantly above Middle East’s average
of 22%. PWC study also reported that asset misappropriation (78%) is the most
common financial crime in the UAE, followed by cybercrime, procurement fraud,
and bribery and corruption. The study also shows that 56% of UAE respondent
14

reported that their organization lost between $100,000 and $5 million due to economic
crime (fraud) which is higher that global average of 2% (PWC, 2014). The above
average rate usually comes with enonomic prosperity and growing economy.
According to Dubai's police chief, Dhabi Khalfan Tamim, fraud and deception
within Dubai's state-linked corporations is high and tough new penalties need to be
imposed on violators. He has also stated that Dubai has witnessed numerous highprofile deception cases since the financial crisis in 2008, and, as there is an abnormally
high rate of corruption, there are many people involved in such acts (Sleiman, 2009).
A recently issued declaration has the authority to enforce prison terms of up to 20
years for criminals, following the tightening of financial regulations by the
Government in the wake of its debt crisis. In 2009, the Dubai public prosecutor
accused several businesspersons and former bank executives on charges of corruption
and dishonesty, claiming that they had defrauded the Dubai Islamic Bank of more
than AED 1.8 billion. However, analysts note that regulation in Dubai has failed to
keep up with the rapid development in business (Sleiman, 2009).
It is also important to note that auditing and forensic accounting is very important
in the public sector than private sector; the issue is related to public money and
government financing. Public interest is important and require governments to
minimize waste and fraud. Any miss use of economic resources would impact the
whole economy. Dubai is also an important setting for this research because of the
increased prominence of Dubai as a regional economic power house with wide
reaching implications for whatever happening in Dubai. In his study, Kasum (2009)
evaluates the extent of financial crimes in developing countries and compares the
private and public sector with a target to clarify the sector where the services of
forensic accountant are more essential. The study found that forensic accountant has
15

a role to play, generally, but more in public sector. Hence, the study recommends the
strengthening of forensic accounting organisation and utilization of their services in
public sector of developing nations economies.
Detecting fraud has become a priority within the accounting profession (Elliott,
2002). Identifying and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not feature
in the usual training and knowledge of audit accountants. Auditors have the capability
to detect fraud, but they often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to translate this
information into a plan that can aid in the future identification of risk factors for
fraudulent activities (Boritz, 2014). This study examines one of these factors, forensic
accounting skills, for the reason that implementing forensic accounting skills among
accounting auditors is a low-cost alternative to recruiting a forensic accountant. If
high skills in forensic accounting compared to low forensic accounting skills can
produce more actual fraud risk valuation, then this would prompt audit organisations
to improve an auditor’s fraud risk valuation through enhancing forensic accounting
skills.
Variations in performance of forensic accountants and other accountants could be
related to different variable, such as differences in intelligence, information/skills,
practice, experience or other individual characteristics (Boritz et al., 2008; Chui,
2010; Popoola, 2015). Based on the literature on performance differences between
forensic accounting and auditors (Asare and Wright, 2004; Boritz et al., 2008;
Popoola, 2015), mental representation is a possible mediator in the connection
between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation performance.

This

potential mediator allows individuals to produce a mental representation of how they
should deal with and resolve the mission at hand (Koonce, 1993; Bonner, 2007). In
fact, if typical audit training does not provide future accountants with the skills
16

required for today's work environment, then it is essential to see whether adding
forensic accounting skills would better equip them for the demands they face.

1.4 Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to explore whether there was a substantial variance
in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation of government auditors who had low
and high forensic accounting skills.

The study also examined the role of mental

representation in the connection between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk
valuation of government auditors. The study intended to determine whether high forensic
accounting skills as opposed to low skills might result in superior fraud risk valuation.
This examination could enrich the knowledge of accounting auditors, who may become
more aware of the importance of forensic accounting skills and could enhance their ability
in conducting a fraud risk valuation.
This study had the distinctive variables of the interrogation and litigation
categories of forensic accountant skills, to investigate how these different skills may
affect the government auditors in focusing their audit processes. The researcher would
like to fill the literature gap in terms of the forensic accounting skills of government
auditors. In other words, in a team of forensic accountants and accounting auditors to
detect fraud, the forensic accountant would rather work with auditors who have high
forensic accounting skills rather than those with low forensic accounting skills. Onodi
Okafor, and Onyali (2015) found that in order to be effective in reducing fraudulent
practices in the banking sector, forensic accountants should have the appropriate skills.
1.5 Research Questions
For the purpose of this study, the researcher used litigation and interrogation skills
of forensic accounting as construct components for forensic accounting skills (Fillmer
2003; Phillips 2009).
17

The research questions of the study are as follows:
RQ1: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills measure
fraud risk as greater, in both high and low fraud risk scenarios, compared to government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills?
RQ2: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills develop a
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills?
RQ3: Will government auditors with a high mental representation in fraud issues
would assess fraud risk as higher in both low and high fraud risk scenarios? will
government auditors with a high mental representation in audit issues would assess fraud
risk as lower in both low and high fraud risk scenarios?
RQ4: Does mental representation mediate the connection between forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation?
1.6 Major Contributions of the Study
This study is the first to examine how different skills in forensic accounting affect
fraud risk valuations in the context of Dubai. The results it yields will enhance the
literature on how different skills in forensic accounting influence fraud risk task
performance.
Furthermore, the study promotes knowledge in the field by discovering fraudlinked mental representation as a probable intermediary between forensic accounting
skills and fraud risk valuation. The results of this study provide support to the theory that
auditors’ fraud risk valuation can perhaps be improved through adopting forensic
accounting skills.
1.7 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the perception of the concept of fraud and the
18

underlying theory, together with an examination of the roles of internal and external
auditors. In addition, the chapter describes the role of forensic accounting and the skills
involved; the difference between audit processes and forensic accounting, and differences
between auditors and forensic accountants in terms of their perception of fraud. The
chapter also includes the development of this study’s hypotheses and research framework
based on the literature review.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the methodology employed in this
study including the research measured variables. Chapter 4 gives a detailed description
of the results following the use of the investigational instrument to assess government
auditors in Dubai. Finally, Chapter 5 provides discussion and conclusion, implications
and recommendation for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an outline of the research structure and a review of the
relevant literature. The chapter starts by detailing the concept of fraud and the underlying
theory behind it. The related literature on the roles of internal and external auditors is
then reviewed, along with the role and skills of forensic accounting, a comparison of audit
processes and forensic accounting, and differences between auditors and forensic
accountants and their perceptions of fraud. The associated literature on fraud risk
valuation is then reviewed, followed by a debate on mental representations.
2.2 The Concept of Fraud and its Underlying Theory
There is an impression that fraud is spread across the globe, and it is commonly
held belief that the task of accounting auditors is to find error as part of the remit for
auditing financial statements (Hussain et al., 2010).

Accounting auditors, forensic

accountant, regulators and others need financial statements to be free of material error.
In the United Arab Emirates, and particularly in Dubai, business is growing dramatically.
Corruption, too, is increasing rapidly, despite the efforts of auditors and forensic
investigators working together to detect fraud. However, auditors’ forensic accounting
skills should be enhanced in order to combat fraud. In other words, accounting auditors
ought to be skilled enough to contend with these fraudulent activities. Fraud - defined as
‘dishonesty in the form of an intentional deception or a wilful misrepresentation of a
material fact’ (Bologna and Lindquist, 1995, p.10) - has always existed within society.
According to Anyanwu (1993), fraud is a performance of deception, intentionally trained
to increase an illegal or unfair advantage, such as dishonesty focused to the detriment of
another. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, fraud is the deliberate
misrepresentation of fact for the purposeof depriving someone of a valuable possession
20

(Britannica, 2009). Ernst and Young (2009) defined deception as a performance of
thoughtful action made by an entity, meaningful that such an action can affect in the
custody of illegal benefits, whilst Keshi (2011) described deception as a means by which
an individual can accomplish a benefit over another by false proposals or defeat of the
truth. However, despite these various definitions of fraud, the most appropriate one for
the purposes of this study is by the well-known professional organization the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2004, p.1): fraud is ‘…the use of one’s occupation
for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing
organisation’s resources or assets.’ Fraud usually comprises some form of dishonesty.
Golden, Skalak, and Mona (2006) suggest that there are numerous different kinds
of fraud, although employee and financial statement fraud are the most relevant to
auditors. Employee fraud includes the robbery of cash or inventory, finance fraud,
kickbacks, and appropriation, whereas financial statement fraud is characterised by
intended misstatements or errors of amounts in financial reporting with the aim of
misleading financial statement users.
2.3 Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT) and Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT)
The practice of theory allows one to clarify visible facts and to offer a theoretical
basis for predicting future events for business management (Salkind, 2006). The
theoretical framework of the study will be based on Donald Cressey’s (1953) fraud
triangle theory (FTT) and the eventual expansion of the fraud diamond theory (FDT)
(Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004). In an attempt to understand the underlying theory behind
fraud, Cressey (1953) conducted 200 interviews with convicted fraudsters over a period
of five months. Themes from the interviews revealed that fraud perpetrators were in a
place of trust within their organisations. They were also in situations that gave them
access to data and opportunities to mislead their associates.
21

Considering these findings, Cressey (1953) established a concept of fraud, which
predicts a probability of the incidence of deception related to the existence of opportunity,
non-shareable financial difficulties, and rationalisation. These three elements of fraud
were summarised by Cressey (1953) and are frequently presented as in Figure 2.1. This
theory serves as the foundation of the FTT, which figures upon traditional fraud theory
by listing the numerous influences that contribute to pressure, opportunity, and
rationalisation.
The idea of supposed opportunity proposes that individuals will take advantage of
the conditions obtainable to them (Kelly & Hartley, 2010). Rae and Subramanian (2008)
highlighted that opportunity relates to the aptitude and power of an employee to identify
weaknesses within an organisational system and to take advantage of these thereby
making deception probable. Generally, the lower the danger of being caught, the more
likely it is that deception will take place (Cressey, 1953).
Pressure is the motivation to commit fraudulent acts or activities (Wilson, 2004).
Murdock (2008) claimed that this pressure could be linked to financial, non-financial,
dogmatic and societal factors. Dogmatic and societal pressure arises where an individual
senses or believes that they cannot face being unsuccessful, due to their status or standing
(Murdock, 2008).
The third element of the FTT is rationalisation, which refers to the justifications
and explanations that individuals give for why immoral conduct is different from illegal
activity. If an individual cannot defend their fraudulent activities, then it is improbable
that he or she will be involved in fraud. An example of a rationalisation is the belief that
fraud is acceptable because an employer is cheating the person of his or her salary
(Cressey, 1953).
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) incorporated the
22

term the ‘fraud triangle’ into Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99 and used it
to organise the discussion of risk factors (AICPA, 2002, p.287).

Figure 2.1: The Fraud Triangle Theory
Source: Cressey (1953)

The fraud triangle theory has been applied by various researchers to examine fraud
in organisations and industries. Aghghaleh, Iskandar, and Mohamed (2014) used the
theory to examine the impact of pressure, opportunity, and rationalisation in determining
fraud in financial statements. Factors such as the size of the audit team and panel of
directors correlated with lower levels of financial statement fraud (Aghghaleh et al.,
2014).

Consistent with the opportunity factors of the fraud diamond theory, the

researchers found that poor internal control and supervision and improper documentation
processes are opportunities that increase the likelihood of fraud. Tsegba, Upaa, and
Tyoakosu (2015) also found that factors such as weak governance, attempts to hide poor
financial performance, and lack of compensation influence the unethical reporting of
financial statements.
Schuchter and Levi (2016) found that the corporate culture of companies
influences the effect of the three components of the triangle in the event of fraud.
Corporate culture can influence whether fraud is perpetrated, or rather whether anti-fraud
behaviours are encouraged (Davis and Pesch, 2013).
23

Fraud is likely to occur in

organisations where corporate leadership is weak (Lenz and Graycar, 2016).

The

perpetration of fraud is likely to continue in the absence of the necessary processes being
implemented to detect fraud within organisations, underscoring the importance of strong
corporate leadership (Lenz et al., 2016; Schuchter and Levi, 2016).
Despite the empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of the fraud triangle
theory, some researchers have contended that the theory is not sufficient in explaining the
occurrence of fraud. For instance, Free (2005) found that the nature of collusion in
fraudulent practices and the regulatory processes that encourage whistle-blowing are new
avenues that can offer a more thoughtful analysis of the occurrence of fraud. McMahon,
Pence, and Bressler (2016) noted that explaining the new tactics in fraud necessitated the
expansion of the classic theory to the diamond theory of fraud.
Based on the fraud diamond theory, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) noted that even
though perceived pressure might co-occur with opportunity and rationalisation, it is
improbable that fraud will take place unless the fourth component of capability also
exists. Mackevicius and Giriunas (2013) have argued that not every individual who
possesses motivation, opportunity, and realisation might commit deception, because they
may lack the capability to carry it out or to cover it. Consequently, Wolfe and Hermanson
(2004) developed the fraud diamond theory (FDT), where capability has been added to
the FTT as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: The Fraud Diamond Theory
Source: Wolfe and Hermanson (2004)

Boyle, DeZoort, and Hermanson (2015) examined the impact of fraud diamond
theory in determining fraud.

The study involved 89 auditors who participated in

experiments. The results of the analysis revealed that auditors were more effective in
evaluating fraud when the fraud diamond practice was used, compared to the fraud
triangle method. The factorial analysis indicated that capability of staff added a predictive
value to the evaluation, highlighting the utility of expanding the classical theory of fraud.
There is empirical evidence supporting the inclusion of capability in explaining
the occurrence of fraud in organisations. Research on the role of the capability of
individuals revealed that there is a connection between the capability of staff and the
perpetuation of fraud (Rayaan, Samsudin, Che-Ahmed, and Popoola, 2016). Popoola
(2015) also found that the capability of individuals plays a role in the perpetration of fraud
in bank companies. Dellaportas (2013) found that fraud offenders were able to deceive
other people by using their positions as professional accountants, underscoring the role
of capability in the perpetration of fraud. When individuals have the power within an
organisation, they have the capability to participate in fraudulent activities (Albrecht,
Holland, Malagueño, Dolan and Tzafrir, 2015). With this power, these individuals also
have the capability to recruit other people within the organisation to participate in
25

fraudulent acts (Albrecht et al., 2015). These discoveries highlight the necessity to take
the compulsory prevention measures to limit the capability of individuals to commit
fraud.
An issue was raised about the two theories discussed above by (Gbegi and
Adebisi, 2013). They suggest that even though the fraud diamond added the fourth
variable “capability” to the fraud triangle and filled the gap in other theories of fraud, the
model alone is an inadequate tool for investigating, deterring, preventing and detecting
fraud. The authors state that the two sides of fraud diamond (incentive/pressure, and
rationalization) cannot be observed, and some important factors like national value
system and corporate governance are ignored.

2.4 Theory Discussion
Golden et al. (2006) noted that employees may either observe an incentive or feel
under pressure to commit fraud, with pressure resulting from unrealistic expectations of
banks, investors or others. There may be pressure on administration, for example, to
reach or beat the expectations of stockholders or creditors. In contrast, an inducement
could arise from situations that may exist for administration or other employees to commit
fraud due to an absence of supervision, or that may be intrinsic to the nature of a business.
Opportunity was the cause behind numerous financial statement fraud cases, which
stemmed from gaps and weakness in internal controls and audits. Rationalisation is the
third aspect of the fraud triangle concept, and in some business divisions, it may be easier
for persons to commit fraud, if there is a lack of communication regarding corporate
ethical values.
Experts such as Dorminey et al. (2010) referred to a second fraud triangle
involving act, disguise and conversion. Carpenter and Mahoney (2001) indicated that
26

fraud among non-management employees poses a greater risk to their organisations than
external or administrative fraud.

Using these representations to identify potential

fraudsters, will enhance a professional’s ability to prevent, deter and inspect fraud.
Fikes (2009) claimed that there are deceptions that frequently go unnoticed, and
when noticed, employees are infrequently punished. The fraud triangle contains three
components, motivation, opportunity and rationalisation, and it is asserted that if any one
of these three components does not occur then a corruption will not happen. However,
Dorminey et al. (2010) claimed that the triangle alone is an insufficient tool for
preventing, foiling, or detecting fraud, and explained that two of its features, pressure and
rationalisation, cannot be detected. Consequently, they argued that the original FTT lacks
objective criteria for recognising pressure and rationalisation.
Both the fraud triangle theory and the fraud diamond theory provide frameworks
to understand and explain the existence of fraud (Omar, Nawawi and Puteh Salin, 2016;
Ruankaew, 2016; Sorunke, 2016). According to Mansor (2015), the divergence between
the two theories necessitates further research on the role of capability in understanding
fraud.

In addition to the three factors of rationalisation, incentive/pressure and

opportunity, the capability of an individual also plays a role in the motivation for fraud
(Mansor, 2015). Specifically, an individual should have the necessary skills or traits to
commit fraud, turning an opportunity into a reality (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).
Dorminey et al., (2010) claimed that the triangle alone is an inadequate tool for deterring,
preventing and detecting fraud due to the fact that two of its characteristics, pressure and
rationalisation, cannot be observed. A summary of Fraud Triangle and Model Extensions
by Dorminey et al., (2010) is shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Fraud Triangle and Model Extensions
Type

Definition

Shortcomings

Extension

Benefit of
Extension

Fraud Triangle

Convergence of

Fraud triangle is from

Fraud diamond: adds an

Capability is

perceived pressure,

the fraudsters

assessment of capability.

generally a more

perceived

perspective, so two

observable

opportunity, and

attributes (pressure and

attribute than

rationalisation to

rationalization) are

pressure or

facilitate fraud.

generally non-

rationalisation.

observable
Perceived Pressure

Non-shareable

Perceived pressure is an

Expand the set of

MICE provide a

financial need.

incomplete descriptor of

fraudsters’ motivations

broader set of

fraudsters’ motivations.

using MICE: money,

fraud motivations

ideology, coercion and

beyond non-

ego (entitlement).

shareable financial
need.

Perceived Opportunity

Opportunity to

Does not address

Focus on an anti-fraud

Understanding

commit and conceal

collusive behavior or

environment, such as

collusive

the fraud act.

management override.

culture, tone at the top,

behaviours better

and engaged corporate

prepares anti-fraud

governance, in addition

professionals for

to traditional internal

the challenges of

controls.

management
override
corruption, and
abuse.

Rationalisation

Morally defensible

Non-observable

Fraud scale: substituting

More visible than

justification for

integrity for

rationalisation by

actions seemingly out

rationalisation.

observing

of character for the

decisions and

fraud perpetrator.

decision-making
processes to assess
a person's
integrity.

Consequently, the researcher posits that auditors well trained in forensic
accounting are a key factor in assessing fraud risk and in reducing opportunities for
committing fraud, which is one of the corners of the fraud triangle. This study builds on
the opportunity angle; thus, forensic accounting and auditing are considered an essential
part of the organisational structure which contributes to reducing fraud opportunities. The
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next section presents a review of the rules for internal and external auditors and forensic
accountants.
2.5 Internal and External Auditors
Internal auditors play a significant role in auditing within their organisations
(Rezaee, 2010). According to Marks (2010), internal auditors are a collection of talented
Source: Dorminey et al., (2010)

persons within most organisations who have the ability to address directors’ needs for
independent and objective assurance. Internal auditing is a methodical process carried
out by the specialised staff of an organisation and is intended to examine and estimate the
adequacy and effectiveness of an organisation's systems for internal control (Abbott,
Parker, and Peters, 2010). According to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA
610) ‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’, the objectives of an internal audit are
determined by management and those charged with governance. Their function is an
appraisal activity established as a service to the entity, including investigating, estimating
and monitoring the efficiency of internal controls.
Internal auditors are tasked with the following: (adapted from ISA 610):
•

Monitoring – revising controls, examining their procedure and identifying
developments.

•

Inspection of financial and operational information – analysis of the
classification and reporting of financial information.

•

Evaluation of operational activities –reviewing the proficiency and
effectiveness of operational activities.

•

Examination of compliance with rules and procedures –reviewing compliance
with rules, procedures and organisation policies, and other internal necessities.

•

Risk management –supporting an administration by assessing extensive
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exposures.
The internal auditor is in a unique situation as a provider of both assurance
services within an organisation and consultancy facilities to managers. Internal auditors
adopt a systematic, controlled approach to examine the efficiency of controls, the
practicality of operations and governance procedures (Kueppers and Sullivan, 2010).
Internal auditors have a strong sense of employee identity within organisations, which
can be both an advantage and a disadvantage whereas external auditors worry that internal
auditors lack objectivity, but their strong sense of identity can be an advantage in terms
of the willingness of employees to share sensitive information during an investigation
(Burt, 2016).
External auditing standards require that external auditors should assess the nature,
effectiveness, and scope of internal auditors’ fieldwork in audit preparation, and on that
basis determine whether to depend on the work of internal auditors (Shu et al., 2011).
External auditing is a methodical process to accurately obtain and estimate evidence
relating to declarations concerning financial actions and events, and to determine the
degree of correspondence between those declarations and established principles. An
organisation charged with conducting an external audit should be independent of the
institution about which it is making such declarations (Council on Foundations, 2010).
According to the Auditing Standards (SAS) No.65, when an external auditor reflects
whether to depend on an internal auditor, then the external auditor must obtain an
adequate assessment of the internal auditor role. In fact, an external auditor must judge
an internal auditor's capability and independence (Desai et al., 2011). Also, SAS No. 99
highlights that an “auditor may respond to an identified risk of material misstatement due
to fraud by assigning a forensic specialist” (AICPA 2002).
According to Fram and Oliver (2010), an external auditor's purposes are to verify that
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the following declarations are in the suitable form:
•

Financial Statements - profit and loss account, balance sheet statement, cash flow
statement and statement of retained earnings

•

Organisation agreements

•

Auctions of main assets

•

Bonus outflows

•

Long-term tenancy arrangements
External auditor's duty is to express an estimation of a company's financial

statements and its control over financial reporting and to take into consideration numerous
stages to assess a corporation’s business in order to classify the risks of material
misstatement and to map and scope an audit. These stages may involve consulting, for
example, community records, historical company reports, and also evidence from outside
predictors (Kueppers & Sullivan, 2010).
2.6 The Role and Skills of Forensic Accountants
Forensic accounting is defined as the practice of accounting, reviewing, and
exploratory skills to support in lawful matters (Bressler, 2011). Heitger and Heitger
(2008) have proposed that forensic accounting is fraud discovery and deterrence,
litigation provision and expert witnessing, and other analytical services.

A recent

definition of forensic accounting that is appropriate for the purpose of this study is that
forensic accounting is the triple preparation of utilising accounting, auditing and
investigative skills to support in lawful issues (Olola, 2016).
Forensic accounting is linked with gathering and assessing monetary evidence
for court (Rosen, 2006). Forensic accounting deals with accounting evidence gathered
through auditing processes to resolve legal issues, which are usually associated with
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financial and assessment issues (Grippo, 2003).
Forensic auditors have two main functions: (a) to engage in investigative
accounting and identify fraudulent activity and (b) to provide litigation support by
attending court as a skilled witness (Phillips, 2009). Litigation support consist of business
valuation, revenue analysis, expert witness testimony, and the evaluation of future
earnings. Interrogation skills are utilised in the process of gathering evidence of illegal
conduct and validating or negating damages (Fillmer, 2003).
The essential attributes of forensic accountants are being analytical, detailoriented and ethical (Rezaee, Lo, Ha, and Suen, 2016). Forensic accounting requires a
distinctive skill set and consists of techniques established uniquely for the purpose of
identifying evidence of dishonesty. The skills used by forensic accountants are both
quantitative and qualitative in nature. Quantitative skills are required for investigating
the numbers to determine fraud, while qualitative skills are involved in being able to
recognise how internal controls can be evaded in order to commit unlawful acts (Davis,
Farrell, and DiGabriele, 2008). Crumbley and Apostolou (2002) described the skills of a
forensic auditor as follows:
•

A solid bookkeeping experience

•

A systematic awareness of auditing actions

•

An understanding of internal controls

•

Skills in fraud discovery procedures

•

An understanding of risk valuation

•

An understanding of the lawful environment

•

Effective communication abilities

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) described the
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components of specialised forensic accountancy as shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Forensic Accountants’ Areas of Specialised Forensic Knowledge
Key: CFF – certified in financial forensics,
CPA – certified public accountant
Source: Adapted from (Durkin and Ueltzen, 2009).

Grippo (2003) argued that successful forensic accounting involves the following:
•

Teaching and training

•

Progressive and continued education in suitable disciplines, such as business
evaluation

•

Differentiated accounting and auditing knowledge

•

Communication assistance – verbal and written

•

Applied business experience

•

Diversified forensic inspecting skill

•

Capability to work in a team situation
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•

Persons skills and elasticity

Durkin and Ueltzen, (2009) suggested that the primary forensic accounting skills
include the following:
•

Specialised responsibilities and practice administration

•

Regulation, court and argument resolution

•

Preparation and training

•

Evidence gathering and protection - documents, meetings/questionings, electronic
data

•

Detection

•

Reportage, professionals, and witnesses

•

Financial statement falsifications

•

Fraud deterrence, discovery, and response

In the view of Crumbley (2006), the characteristics of forensic accounting are like
a three-layer wedding cake. The first layer is a solid background in accounting. The
second layer is a deep background in investigative auditing experience. The third layer
is knowledge of the law and computer technique.

The objectives of forensic accountants, as opposed to auditors, are detection,
applying specialised inspection practices, and having a thorough understanding of the
requirements of evidence and regulation. Their responsibility is to classify patterns of
abuse and they are tasked with the following (adapted from Bressler, 2011): (a) the
consciousness of lawyers and juries in the law court system as to the importance of
forensic auditor information of an accounting information system, (b) the ability to bring
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clarity when appearing in fraud cases, and (c) understanding the accounting information
systems which have been affected by deception. Their level of skills determines their
ability to adequately fulfil these key tasks as forensic accountants (Gbegi and Adebisi,
2014).

In the following subsections, a review of audit processes versus forensic

accounting and differences in the perception of fraud is presented.
2.7 Audit Processes versus Forensic Accounting
The work of auditors and forensic accountants has both similarities and
differences (Tiwari and Debnath, 2017). The procedures used by accountants differ from
those used by forensic accountants when investigating the financial records of a company.
According to Golden et al. (2006), while regular accountants and forensic accountants
both seek to notice financial loss, either from mistakes and material misstatements or due
to fraud, they have different purposes, values, and bases of evidence. The objective of an
accountant is to give an estimation concerning financial statements and the performance
of the institution being audited, together with its financial situation. In contrast, the
objective of a forensic auditor is to determine whether a fraud has occurred and/or an
intentional material misstatement.

Forensic accountants also prepare the necessary

documents for presentation in courts for legal action (Matson, 2016). Their work is used
in courts as evidence, helping judges in making their decisions (Matarneh et al., 2015).
The value of the accountant is to add consistency to a financial statement, whereas
the value of a forensic accountant is to determine the facts and resolve doubts
(Muhammad Zahirul et al., 2010).

An auditor uses observations and accounting

transactions as sources of evidence, while a forensic investigator uses financial and nonfinancial data, and conducts interviews, as further sources of evidence to determine the
facts. Unlike auditors, forensic accountants regularly spend weeks working on a case to
arraign fraud. Therefore, they should be well qualified in the rules of evidence, financial
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statistics, and accounting information systems, in addition to being skilled in persuading
a judge of their expertise (Muhammad Zahirul et al., 2010).
Auditors have the capability to detect fraud, but they often lack the necessary
skills and knowledge to translate this information into a plan that can aid in the future
identification of risk factors facilitating fraudulent activities (Boritz et al., 2014). This
limitation can be addressed by forensic accountants whose skills in detecting fraud are
considered more advanced than those of auditors (Matarneh et al., 2015). Investigative
skills and possession of a wide range of knowledge are essential to the work of forensic
accountants (Matson, 2016).

According to Tiwari and Debnath (2017), forensic

accounting is multi-disciplinary and encompasses a wide range of fields including
auditing, accounting, legal rules, statistics, information technology, and human analytical
skills. When auditors can no longer perform a particular investigative task due to its
complexity, the help of forensic accountants is often solicited (Matarneh et al., 2015).
Forensic accountants go beyond the conventional methods used by auditors, making their
work more comprehensive and exhaustive (Ahmed, 2016).
2.8 Variation in the Perception and Investigation of Fraud
Prior studies have shown that auditors and forensic investigators have different
perceptions and processes in investigating fraud. Harris and Brown (2000) argued that
fraudulent cases regularly go unobserved by internal and external auditors, and may only
become visible after considerable suffering is incurred. Thus the roles and measures of
accounting auditors and forensic auditors differ.
Christensen et al. (2005) noted that according to specialised auditing standards,
the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether caused by error or fraud. They added that a mistake in financial statements can
36

be an accidental mistake, while fraud is the real intent to cheat. Additionally, many
accounting auditors basically do not have the involvement and experience of how to find
and detect fraud since they are not qualified in these matters. Conversely, a forensic
accountant plays an extensive role in investigating the financial information of a
company, and Harris and Brown (2000, p. 6) stated that a ‘forensic accountant possess
skills beyond those of a traditional auditor and delivers services outside the scope of a
representative financial audit engagement.’
A forensic accountant likewise looks for many other issues linked to fraud
detection, including recognising income before it is received or the recording of fabricated
revenues, shifting income to other periods, and not disclosing responsibilities owed by a
company (Crumbley & Apostolou, 2002). In contrast, auditors look for compliance with
standards and regulations, and offer assurance services, in addition to having a
responsibility to identify financial misstatement due to fraud. Forensic accountants are
frequently called in to examine and resolve doubts that financial misstatement due to
deception has occurred (Golden et al., 2006).
From the perspective of forensic accountants, Van Akkeren and Buckby (2015)
found that fraud was perceived to be a result of strain and anomie. The recruitment of
deviant sub-groups and coercion of members to provide relief from strain were perceived
by forensic accountants as determinants of fraud. The results also revealed that the lack
of adequate mechanisms for corporate governance provides an opportunity for fraudulent
activities to occur.
Investigative techniques are needed to address fraudulent activities in companies
successfully (Dada, 2014). Boritz et al. (2014) compared the investigative procedures
used by auditors and forensic accountants and also compared their relative effectiveness.
The results of the analysis revealed that fraud accountants and auditors generally use the
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same number of procedures in assessing fraud. The cumulative effectiveness of these
procedures appears to be similar. Fraud accountants, use more non-standard audit
procedures, although these are only marginally more effective than the procedures
typically used by auditors.

Despite these additional non-standard procedures, the

resources needed to use these methods appear to be minimal, especially when compared
to the budget proposals of auditors.
2.9 Fraud Risk Valuation
Fraud risk valuation is a complex process performed by auditors, requiring
advanced cognitive skills (Desai & Gupta, 2016). Fraud risk valuations assist an auditor
in defining the nature and degree of the audit procedures required to increase the
possibility of uncovering fraud (Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges, 2011). Fraud risk valuations
also help in determining the appropriate procedure needed to conduct an audit (Gerson et
al., 2006).
Clements and Knudstrup (2016) examined the different fraud investigation
procedures that are most often performed by fraud investigators. The exploratory study
involved the participation of 201 fraud investigators. The results of the analysis revealed
that the most frequently performed procedures used by fraud investigators were
determining if management is overriding control and examining cancelled cheques and
bank statements. Other important procedures used to determine fraud included an
examination of documents for erasures and alterations, examination of cancelled cheques,
application of ratio and horizontal/vertical analysis, examination of expense invoices, and
searching for unusual behaviours.
Because of the advanced cognitive skills involved in fraud risk valuations (Desai
& Gupta, 2016), many accountants are poor appraisers of fraud risk (Allen et al., 2006;
Cushing et al., 1995; Knapp and Knapp, 2001). Auditors are not conventionally trained
38

to handle fraud valuation (Asare et al., 2015). Forensic experts handle fraud valuation
because of the specialised training and knowledge they possess (Asare et al., 2015).
Consequently, a number of researchers have focused on developing auditors' fraud
risk valuation capabilities (Allen et al., 2006; Cushing et al., 1995; Patterson and Noel,
2003). Desai and Gupta (2016) contend that selective perceptions about the significance
of situational factors such as opportunities and pressures can lessen the cognitive
complexity of fraud risk valuation. As a result, auditors are more likely to come up with
an appropriate final valuation of fraud risk.
Research studies have examined the effect of fraud risk valuation on the detection
of fraud (Nahariah, 2011; Silver et al., 2008). Some studies have shown the importance
of forensic accounting in detecting fraud and in fraud risk valuation (Baird and Zelin,
2009; Covaleski, 2003; Gottschalk, 2010). Others have begun to examine the contrasts
in fraud risk assessment execution between misrepresentation specialists and budgetary
bookkeepers (Boritz et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2009).
According to Palmrose (1987), measuring misrepresentation hazard as low when
fraudulent activity is present makes an audit firm vulnerable to major losses, including
claims, excessive settlements, and damage to reputation. Jaffar et al. (2008) found that
in a high fraud risk situation, an auditor's capability to measure fraud risk has a positive
effect on their ability to notice the likelihood of fraud, whereas, in a low fraud risk
situation, it does not. Furthermore, Koonce (1993) argued that an analytical review
should be used for planning purposes in order to identify high and low risk areas and to
facilitate planning the nature, timing, and extent of other audit procedures. Therefore,
when assessing the fraud risk it is vital that auditors are capable of recognising when the
danger of fraud is great.
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2.10 Mental Representation
Mental representation is the representation of a problem in the working memory
of an individual, which determines the cognitive process for making sense of the
information in a particular display format (Song, Chan, and Wright, 2016). Mental
representation allows individuals to produce a mental picture of how a specific task
should be addressed and solved (Christ, 1993; Koonce, 1993). Mental representation
encompasses the current formulation or understanding of a mental situation (Sanford
1985). Koonce (1993) clarified that when attempting to form a mental image, an
individual will use the available information to isolate relevant declarative and procedural
knowledge1 stored in the long-term memory.
Psychology research has revealed that the amount of domain-specific information
influences the content and excellence of an individual's mental representations (Larkin
1983; Glaser 1984). Eventually, this procedure allows individuals to create a mental
picture of the context, which helps them to concentrate and resolve a decision mission by
recovering related information from earlier constructed mental issues (Glaser, 1984;
Wyer and Srull, 1980).
According to Pearson and Kosslyn (2015), mental representations can occur in
different formats. The more traditional view is that humans rely on propositional internal
representations, where information is represented in terms of language that conveys
verbal statements. Another perspective on mental representation is that information is
depictive, that is, it involves pictorial information, wherein functional space is considered
when objects are represented in the mind.

1

Declarative knowledge involves information, for instance a sale recorded in the wrong period is a
financial statement error, while procedural knowledge entails knowing how to do something, for
example assess financial viability (Anderson, 1983).
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Chen, Khalifa, and Trotman (2014) examined the impact of the mental
representation of tasks from group brainstorming on accountants’ identification of
potential frauds. Mental representation was examined in terms of simultaneous and
sequential unpacking of potential frauds. The results of the experimental study revealed
that among experienced auditors, sequential rather than simultaneous unpacking of the
brainstorming tasks into several risk categories was more effective in influencing the
identification of potential fraud. The results also indicated that the positive effects of
sequential unpacking persisted when other team members identified fraud. However, one
negative effect of sequential unpacking is the reduction of the level of professional
scepticism.
According to Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014), the format of mental
representation used by auditors can have an effect on their ability to assess risk. When
mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants may be
more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective fraud risk
valuation. Confirming this would necessitate examining whether different forensic
accounting skills (high or low skills) lead to a different mental representation, which then
impacts the government auditors' performances in fraud risk evaluation.
2.11 Forensic Accounting Literature
Forensic accounting is encouraged by numerous professional organisations and
associations, and the top three accounting services which fall within the forensic
accounting area are deception, litigation provision, and business evaluations (Covaleski
2003). A large number of studies have shown the importance of forensic accounting in
the detection of fraud (Asare et al., 2015). Baird and Zelin (2009) argued that forensic
accounting is an important exploratory tool for the recognition of fraud. Gottschalk
(2010) acknowledged that the focus of forensic accounting is on evidence gathered
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through the examination of documents.

In addition, they specified that forensic

accounting is crucial to the legal system, through the provision of expert services, such
as suspicious bankruptcy valuations, and the analysis of financial documents in fraud
schemes.
Salleh and Ab Aziz (2014) conducted an empirical study to explore the different
traits, skills, and ethical values of forensic accountants in the public sector. The sample
consisted of professionals in the field of forensic accounting and individuals who employ
their services, such as auditors and academicians. The results of the analysis revealed
that no particular coherent traits or relevant skills were agreed upon by the participants in
the study, suggesting that the traits and skills of forensic accountants tend to be varied.
Forensic accounting studies can be classified into three groups: studies that
involve interest in the future of forensic accounting, studies highlighting audit processes
versus forensic accounting; and studies that examine fraud detection by forensic
accountants. An evaluation of the literature reveals that forensic accounting plays an
important role in today's business environment. The majority of both researchers and
consultants assume that future interest in forensic accounting will rise and increasing
education is reported in this field (Rezaee, 2004). A study conducted by Carpenter (2007)
suggested there have been indications that the future call for auditing services will depend
on an auditor’s ability to detect fraud, highlighting that forensic accounting procedures
may represent a necessary addition to current auditors' expertise.
A number of studies have focused on the rising demand for auditors to conduct
forensic accounting activities (Baron, 2006; Cohen, Crain, & Sanders, 1996; Rezaee,
Crumbley, and Elmore, 2004; Wells, 2003). Some have shown the importance of forensic
accounting in detecting fraud (Baird & Zelin, 2009; Covaleski 2003; Gottschalk, 2010),
whilst others have focused on the delivery of forensic accounting education (Kleyman,
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2006; Rezaee, 2004).
Recognising the importance of forensic accounting and the need to develop the
problem-solving skills necessary to determine and assess fraud, university leaders have
started to offer courses in forensic accounting. According to Lee, Cefaratti, and Green
(2015), a course on forensic accounting is an extension of auditing, adding more emphasis
on the detection and quantification of fraud. Forensic accounting courses offered in
universities also aim to improve the ability of students to understand the perspective of
fraudsters (Lee et al., 2015).
Several studies have been conducted to examine the role of forensic accounting
in combating fraud, with most studies pointing to the effectiveness of forensic accounting
skills as tools to detect financial crimes.

Ezejiofor, Nwakoby, and Okoye (2016)

examined the effect of forensic accounting in fighting fraudulent activities in the Nigerian
banking sector. Data were collected using a survey questionnaire and the participants
were 55 individuals from commercial banks in Nigeria. The results of the data analysis
indicated that forensic accounting is an effective tool for combating financial fraud in the
banking sector. The results also revealed that forensic audit could be instrumental in
enhancing corporate governance.
Kennedy and Anyaduba (2013) examined the effectiveness of forensic accounting
in controlling financial fraud, financial reporting, and the quality of internal processes.
The sample consisted of 143 different stakeholders such as accountants, company staff,
and auditors, who were all asked to answer survey questionnaires. The Binomial test was
utilised as the data analysis strategy. The results of the data analysis revealed that there
was a consensus among the different participants that forensic accounting was effective
in controlling financial fraud, financial reporting, and quality of internal processes. These
findings highlight the relevance of forensic accounting in fraud detection and assessment
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in the banking industry.
Dada, Owolabi, and Okwu (2013) conducted a quantitative study to examine the
effectiveness of forensic accounting in reducing fraudulent activities. Multiple regression
analysis was used to analyse the data collected from both survey questionnaires and
interviews. Data analysis revealed that the reduction of fraud is positively related to its
detection as a result of the work of forensic accountants. These findings highlight the
significance of forensic accounting as a method of controlling fraudulent activities.
Ahmed (2016) examined the effectiveness of forensic accounting in reducing
fraudulent practices in the banking industry in Bangladesh. The results revealed that
forensic accounting was effective in reducing financial fraudulent activities by enhancing
transparency, accountability and ethics.
Research has also suggested that accountants’ attitude toward fraud differ across
countries and culture. For instance, (Sean T, 2012) shows that firms headquartered in
areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of
financial reporting irregularities.
The researcher chose to test the skill of forensic accountants since this is an
important factor determining the effectiveness of forensic accountancy. Onodi, Okafor,
and Onyali (2015) found that in order to be effective in reducing fraudulent practices in
the banking sector, forensic accountants should have the appropriate skills. Specifically,
forensic accountants should have awareness and knowledge of the different methods that
can be used to investigate fraudulent activities.
This study is like other studies in the same field of fraud, auditors, and forensic
accounting.

In his study "An Experimental Examination of The Effects of Fraud

Specialist and Audit Mindsets On Fraud Risk Assessments And On The Development Of
Fraud-Related Problem Representations", Chui (2010) examined fraud specialist and
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audit mindsets regarding fraud risk assessment. This study and Chui (2010) are similar
and in the same field. However, this study has used different variables: the independent
variable of this study was "the interrogation and litigation categories of forensic
accountant skills", unlike Chui, (2010) who used "audit mindsets" as an independent
variable for his study. Also, this study has used a different population, namely Dubai
government auditors whereas Chui, (2010) used university students. The purpose of this
study was to examine if there was a significant difference in the fraud risk valuation and
mental representation of government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting
skills. On the other hand, the purpose of Chui (2010) was to consider the effects of fraud
specialist and audit mindsets on fraud risk assessment. In addition, comparing this study
with Chui (2010), they both have different understandings and explanations of the
Theory. Unlike Chui (2010), this study used fraud diamond theory (FDT) to provide
frameworks to understand and explain the existence of fraud. Specifically, the researcher
hypothesized that well trained auditors in forensic accounting are a key factor in assessing
fraud risk and in reducing opportunities for committing fraud, which is one of the corners
of the fraud triangle. This study builds on the opportunity angle. Thus, forensic
accounting and auditing are considered an essential part of the organisational structure
which contributes to reducing fraud opportunities.
Efiong, (2013), in his study "An exploration of forensic accounting education and
practice for fraud prevention and detection in Nigeria", investigated how forensic
accounting education would enhance fraud prevention and detection. The objective of
his study was to explore the level of awareness of forensic accounting techniques among
practitioners of the accounting profession, students and academics. Efiong’s, (2013)
methodology was mixed method, using both oral interview as qualitative and descriptive
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statistics as quantitative methods. The methodology of this study, however, was purely
quantitative.
Leonard (2014) in his study "The Impact of Fraud Education on Fraud Detection"
hypothesised that forensic students would be better able to detect fraud than the
professional accounting students. The population considered by Leonard, (2014) was
graduate level professional accounting and forensic accounting students. The study
focused on the importance of discovering the value of a forensic degree and its impact on
students’ ability to better detect fraud. The results of Leonard’s study showed a strong
correlation between the effect of fraud training and a student’s performance on detecting
fraud. Although this study and Leonard’s study are in the same field of forensic
accounting, they both have totally different objectives.
A recent similar study is done by Popoola (2015) in "An empirical investigation
of fraud risk assessment and knowledge requirement on fraud-related problem
representation in Nigeria." Although there are similarities in this study and that of
Popoola, (2015), the purpose of the latter was to investigate fraud risk assessment task
performance (TPFRA) and the knowledge requirement (KR) of the forensic accountant
and auditor regarding fraud-related problem representation in the Nigerian public sector.
Yet, this study was to examine if there was a significant difference in the fraud risk
valuation and mental representation of government auditors who had low and high
forensic accounting skills. The respondents in Popoola’s study were auditors and forensic
accountants in Nigeria’s public sector, whereas the respondents in this study were Dubai
government auditors.

Unlike Popoola, (2015) who investigated the Knowledge

Requirement (KR) of the forensic accountant and auditor regarding fraud-related problem
representation, the researcher of this study examined forensic accounting skills among
government auditors in Dubai, and the way these skills affected their performance in fraud
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risk valuations.
2.12 Audit Regulations – Dubai
This section outlines the regulations that auditors in private and public sectors in
Dubai have to follow, Law No. (4) of 2018, discusses Dubai’s legal governments
requirements with regard public sector forensic audit. Also Federal Law No. 2 of 2015,
is related to private sector audit requirements that apply on all UAE entities.
First, Law No. (4) of 2018, replaces Law No 8 of 2010, regarding the
establishment of the Financial Audit Authority (FAA). This law clarifies that the
Financial Audit Authority (FAA) is tasked with controlling public funds, and its spending
and management. The Authority also seeks to ensure that departments under the purview
of this Law spend public funds efficiently and effectively. The Authority is also tasked
with making sure that administrative decisions and processes conform to Dubai’s
regulations and its high standards of transparency and integrity. The Authority is also
responsible for investigating any financial or administrative irregularities discovered by
the FAA or entities under its control, identifying the reasons behind it and taking
appropriate actions. It is also tasked with ensuring that entities under the FAA’s control
comply with regulations and policies; verifying the calculation and collection of public
revenues and financial returns from the provision of services; ensuring that banks
operating in Dubai adhere to regulations; and making sure that fees, prices, taxes, sales
revenues, profits, etc. are correctly calculated as per the provisions of the regulation.
It is important to highlight the government auditors are also responsible over
auditing companies that are wholly owned by the Government or Companies in which
the Government’s share is not less than 25 percent.
Second, according to the Federal Law No (2) of 2015 on commercial companies,
article 6 regarding the Corporate Governance in which it states the following:
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1- With the exception of banks, financing companies, financial investment
companies, exchange and money brokerage companies, the Minister shall
issue the decisions which set the general framework regulating Governance in
connection with private joint stock companies where the number of the
shareholders therein exceeds 75- As for the Public Joint Stock Companies, the
Chairman of the Authority shall issue the relevant Governance Decisions.
2- The Board of Directors of a company or its managers, depending on the
circumstance, shall be responsible for the application of the rules and criteria of
Governance.
Article number 26- Accounting Records which states the following:
1- Every company shall keep accounting records showing its transactions to
accurately reveal at any time the financial position of the company and
enabling the partners or shareholders to confirm that the accounts of the
company are properly kept in accordance with the provisions of this Law.
2- Every company shall keep its accounting books in its head office for a
period of at least 5 (five) years from the end of the financial year of the
company.
3- The company may keep an electronic copy of the original of the
documents and records kept and deposited therein in accordance with the
controls issued by a Ministerial Decision.
Article 102- Auditor of the Company which states the following:
A Limited Liability Company shall have one or more auditors to be elected by
the General Assembly of the partners every year and, other than as provided by
Article 244 of this Law, the provisions concerning the auditors in public joint
stock companies shall apply to the auditor of a Limited Liability Company. The
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expression "Competent Authority" shall substitute the term "Authority" wherever
it appears.
2.13 Research Gap
A review of literature reveals that forensic accounting plays an important role in
today's business environment. A majority of both academics and practitioners expect that
future demand for and interest in forensic accounting will increase and many studies are
reported in this field (Rezaee, 2004). A study conducted by Carpenter (2007) suggests
that there have been signs that the future demand for auditing services will be reliant upon
the auditors' ability to detect fraud, and further highlights that forensic accounting
procedures may represent an addition to a current auditor's expertise. Briefly, a number
of studies focused on the rising demand for auditors to conduct forensic accounting
activities (Cohen, Crain, and Sanders, 1996; Baron, 2006; Wells, 2003; Rezaee,
Crumbley, and Elmore, 2004).
Studies discussed thus far are classified into three groups. The first group consists
of studies that examine the future demand for and interest in forensic accounting. The
second group consists of studies highlighting the audit processes versus forensic
accounting. The third group consists of studies that examine fraud detection by the
forensic accountant.
In addition, no study has been conducted to examine the components of forensic
accounting skills to assess fraud risk appraisal. Further, the mediation variable has been
tested for the first in UAE.
Although, much has been done on forensic accounting and auditing performance,
no study has been conducted regarding the relation between the forensic accounting skills
and government auditor performance in fraud risk valuation in the context of Dubai.
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2.14 Hypothesis Development and Research Framework
According to Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007), researchers formulate a
hypothesis to make a prediction about the results of a study based on previous research.
Building on the literature on forensic accounting skills, mental representation, and fraud
risk valuations (Bologna and Lindquist, 1987; Boritz et al., 2008; Chui, 2010; Enofe,
2013; Bhasin, 2013; Popoola, 2014), the research framework shown in Figure 2.4 was
developed by the current researcher.

Figure 2.4: Research Framework

Figure 2.4 summarises the research model and hypotheses of the study. Path
diagram (H1) represents the direct effect of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk
valuation. Path diagram (H2) represents the effect of forensic accounting skills on audit
mental representation and fraud mental representation. Path diagram (H3) represents the
effects of mental representation on fraud risk valuation for both low and high fraud case
scenarios.
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothetical relation in the research framework of this
study signifies the researcher’s prediction that forensic accounting skills will have a direct
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influence on a fraud risk valuation. Based on the author’s actual experience, Davia (2000)
highlighted how to perform detection procedures for every major type of fraud. Prior
literature concerning forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation recognised that
auditors equipped with high forensic accounting skills are better able to discern fraud and
to act as expert witnesses in court (Boritz, 2008; Wells, 2005; Popoola, 2014).
On the other hand, an auditor’s skill is essentially to plan and perform an audit, to
obtain reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether caused by error or fraud. In other words, auditors essentially do not have
experience of how to find and detect fraud since they are not skilled in these matters
(Christensen, 2005; Wells, 2005). In addition, they have demonstrated that forensic skills
are essential to detect fraud. While fraud risk assessors have the required skills, financial
auditors do not have necessary skills; and therefore would not be able to perform their
duties and discover fraud.
Based on the above discussions, previous studies and literature, the following
hypotheses are suggested:
Hypothesis H1: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will
measure fraud risk as greater in both high and low fraud risk scenarios compared to
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
Hypothesis H1 is extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows:
H1(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure
fraud risk in high fraud risk scenarios higher than government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills.
H1(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure
fraud risk in low fraud risk scenarios higher than government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills.
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Hypothesis 2: The second hypothetical relation in the research framework of this
study highlights that government auditors who are equipped with high forensic
accounting skills will develop a mental representation that is dissimilar from that of
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills, Chui (2010). It was predicted
that government auditors with low forensic accounting skills would be likely to
concentrate on information linked to whether a transaction was sustained by an
appropriate audit track, and whether there were any substantial misstatements.

In

contrast, a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills would be likely to
concentrate on information linked to whether a transaction had really occurred, and if
there were any misstatements in the financial statements Chui (2010). Kadous and Sedor
(2004) studied the use of mental representation with decision-making concepts to develop
a cognitive framework for escalation-like behaviour among advisors. They hypothesised
that consultants who are required to recommend whether to continue or discontinue a
project are more likely to acquire and retain in their memory information about critical
threats to project viability compared to consultants who are not assigned a relevant
purpose. According to Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014), the format of mental
representation used by auditors can have an effect on their ability to assess risk. When
mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants may be
more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective fraud risk
valuation.
Consequently, the following hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis H2: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will
develop a mental representation that is different from government auditors with low
forensic accounting skills.
Hypothesis H2 is extended to four sub-hypotheses as follows:
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H2(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a
fraud mental representation measured by a recall task higher than government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a
fraud mental representation measured by a memory recognition task higher than
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(c): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an
audit mental representation as measured by a recall task lower than government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(d): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an
audit mental representation as measured by a memory recognition task lower than
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
Hypothesis 3: The third hypothetical relation in the research framework of this
study highlights that there is an intervening relation between forensic accounting skills
and fraud risk valuation. Literature has shown that the work of auditors and forensic
accountants has both similarities and differences (Golden, Skalak, and Mona, 2006;
Tiwari and Debnath, 2017). The procedures used by accountants differ from those used
by forensic accountants when investigating the financial records of a company.
DiGabriele (2008), and Davis et al. (2010), claimed that special skills can produce a
performance difference in decision making. Therefore, it is hypothesised as follows:
Hypothesis H3: Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud
issues will assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental
representation in fraud issues, whereas, government auditors with high mental
representation in audit issues will assess fraud risk valuation lower than auditors with
high mental representation in fraud issues.
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Therefore, H3 may be extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows:
H3(a): Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will
assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental
representation in fraud issues.
H3(b): Government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will
assess fraud risk valuation lower than government auditors with high mental
representation in fraud issues.
Hypothesis 4: As previously mentioned, Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014),
argued that the format of mental representation used by auditors can influence their ability
to assess risk. When mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic
accountants may be more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective
fraud risk valuation. The researcher posits that mental representation would be a potential
mediator variable between the skills of forensic accounting and fraud risk valuation. If
the mediation were confirmed, the researcher would conclude there is no direct
relationship between the two variables. Thus, the following Hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis H4: Mental representation mediates the connection between forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.
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CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the research methodology used in this study will be thoroughly
detailed. The main procedure used to test the study hypotheses is outlined, together with
the development and validation process for the instrument utilised. This study has
hypothesised that there is both a direct and indirect (through the mediator, mental
representation) effect between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses
The researcher would like to highlight that the current research uses litigation and
interrogation skills of forensic accounting as construct components for forensic
accounting skills (Fillmer 2003; Phillips 2009).
The research questions of the study are the following:
RQ1: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills measure
fraud risk as greater, in both high and low fraud risk scenarios, compared to government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills?
RQ2: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills develop a
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills?
RQ3: Does mental representation mediate the connection between forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation?
Based on the three research questions of the study, the corresponding hypotheses
are the following:
H1: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure fraud
risk as greater in both high and low fraud risk scenarios compared to government auditors
with low forensic accounting skills.
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H2: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will develop a
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills.
H3: Government auditors with a high mental representation in fraud issues would
assess fraud risk higher in both low and high fraud risk scenarios. Government auditors
with a high mental representation in audit issues would assess fraud risk lower in both
low and high fraud risk scenarios.
H4: Mental representation mediates the connection between forensic accounting
skills and fraud risk valuation.
3.3 Nature of the Study
A quantitative research method was utilised for this study. The sample consisted
of 96 government auditors from the Financial Audit Department (FAD) located in Dubai.
Data for this study was collected with an Investigation instrument. The study variables
include the independent variable of forensic accounting skills (both categories
interrogation and litigation), the dependent variable of fraud risk valuation, and the
possible mediator variable of mental representation. In stage 1 of the study, forensic
accounting skills (the independent variable) were measured by asking questions
concerning both litigation and interrogation forensic accounting skills. In stage 2, the
researcher measured fraud risk valuation (the dependent variable) through a case
concerning Lakeview Lumber Inc.

In stage 3, the mediator variable, mental

representations, was measured by participants performing a recall task requiring them to
list all the significant information that they could recall about the Lakeview case. In
further measuring of the mediator variable, mental representations, participants undertook
a memory recognition assessment containing ‘true or false’ questions related to the case.
Finally, stage 4 consisted of demographic enquiries. During the data analysis, an
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independent T-test, Pearson correlation analysis, and also regression analysis were
employed to test Hypotheses One and Two, whilst regression analysis following the steps
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) was used to test mediation hypotheses.
3.4 Instrumentation and Operationalisation of the Constructs
Survey designs are suitable for describing and associating the trends within a
population (Creswell, 2002). The purpose of this survey was clearly detailed to encourage
respondents (government auditors) to provide correct answers to the survey questions.
Respondents were assured of the privacy of their answers and that all responses would
remain anonymous. The survey questions were kept brief to enhance the response rate
and the understanding of the expected respondents. An advantage to limited questions is
that respondents are more likely to answer a question thoughtfully, rather than purely
filling in a questionnaire to please a researcher.
To achieve the objectives of the study, it was essential to categorise the research
respondents as either a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills or as
government auditor with low forensic accounting skills. The method of categorising was
based on the prior literature on forensic accounting skills (Bologna and Lindquist, 1987;
Fillmer, 2003; Coulbert, 2004; Enofe, 2013; Bhasin, 2013; Astutie, and Utami, 2013), in
which it is asserted that forensic accounting as a discipline incorporates information of
the legal system and investigatory activities.
Curtis (2008) argued that one of the more common uses of forensic accounting is
in the examination and prosecution of deception, highlighting that forensic accounting is
crucial to the legal system by providing skilled services, such as net worth assessments
in separation proceedings, asset evaluations in liquidation matters, financial statement
analysis in securities and tax cases, and the analysis of financial papers in deception
schemes. Litigation support consists of business evaluation, revenue investigation, being
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a skilled witness, and future pay cheques evaluation, while investigative accounting is the
procedure of gathering evidence of illegal conduct, and verifying or disproving damages
(Fillmer, 2003).
Four investigational stages were carried out to establish the validity of the research
instrument.

After choosing questions to test litigation and interrogation forensic

accounting skills, a group of specialists was formed with the intent of validating whether
these questions precisely depicted the skills of forensic accounting. Various professionals
were asked to provide their opinions, based on the standards proposed by Bologna and
Lindquist (1987), which included the experts' identifications, licensure, and authorisation,
as well as writing and publications in their field of proficiency. Table 3.1 shows details
of the group of specialists.
Table 3.1: Specialists Group
Deception/ Forensic Specialists
Expert 1 – A Professor in the Faculty of Business and a former Chairman of the
Department of Accounting at the University of Jordan with more than 10 years’
experience
Expert 2 – A Senior Financial Controller (MSc., MBA, Ph.D., PDD, CMA, CFM)
with more than 10 years’ experience
Audit Specialists
Expert 3 – A Director General of the Financial Audit Department with more than
35 years’ experience
Expert 4 – An audit manager with 8 years’ experience

The group of specialist's panel consisted of experts in either the deception/forensic
or the auditing field. Four specialists were referred to during the expansion of the
valuation of forensic accounting skills. The researcher first described the study and its
objectives to the specialists and then outlined the initial key forensic accounting skills
that had been identified in the literature. The group of specialists were asked to provide
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their opinions on whether the questions posed provided a satisfactory representation of
their respective professions and to add any further questions relevant to the skills of
forensic accounting. In addition, the experts were asked to help with the information to
classify participants’ recall, concerning inspection-related matters, possible fraud-related
matters, and case facts.
3.5 Measurement of the Research Framework Variables
The methodology of this study includes 4 investigational stages to measure the research
variables as detailed below.
3.5.1 Stage I:
In the first stage, the independent variable forensic accounting skills is measured
where the 96 government auditors were categorised either with high forensic accounting
skills or with low forensic accounting skills.
When measuring forensic accounting skills, the attention was on questions that
tested both litigation and interrogation constructs of forensic accounting skills; these
questions were based on Bremser (1995), as well as experts’ opinions as described
previously. Based on Reimers et al., 1993, twenty (20) questions were employed to test
forensic accounting skills, and the participant received one point for each correct response
and zero for an incorrect answer; thus, the total scores for the forensic accounting skills
test would range starts from zero up to twenty. Ten questions tested litigation skills and
the other ten questions tested interrogation skills. Litigation questions 1, 9, and 10 relate
to the expert witness aspect of litigation skills; for example:
The forensic accountant work as an expert usually results in a written report that
typically includes all the following except.....
Litigation questions 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 relate to the collection of evidence part of litigation
skills; for example:
The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be
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introduced in court is….
Litigation questions 3 and 4 relate to the business evaluation part of litigation skills; for
example:
To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil actions, the
three basic elements that must be proven include all the following except .
Interrogation questions 1, 2, and 4 relate to the interrogation process part of interrogation
skills; for example:
In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the
following?....
Interrogation questions 8, 9, and 10 relate to the substantiating or disproving damages
part of interrogation skills; for example:
An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask….
Interrogation questions 3, 5, 6 and 7 relate to the interview part of interrogation skills;
for example:
The advantages of going to the interviewee's location are that….
This stage enabled the researcher to measure the variables forensic accounting skills
(litigation); forensic accounting skills (interrogation); and the overall forensic accounting
skills which is the aggregate of the two variables.
3.5.2 Stage II:
In the second stage, the researcher used the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study to
measure the level of performance of the government auditors in fraud risk valuation in
both high and low fraud risk scenarios. The case study was adapted from Lindberg
(1999)2. In fact, the researcher selected this case because of its similarity to many recent
fraud cases in Dubai. Similar many cases, as mentioned earlier, the Dubai public

2

The researcher requested and received approvals from the original authors to use the case
(Lakeview Lumber Inc) and the questions to test forensic accounting skills (appendix d); also the same
instrument was used by Chui (2010) to determine the effects of mind-set on fraud risk assessment.
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prosecutor in 2009 indicted numerous businesspersons and former bank executives on
charges of bribery and corruption, alleging that they had defrauded the Dubai Islamic
Bank of more than AED 1.84 billion. Analysts note that regulation in Dubai has failed to
keep up with the rapid growth in business (Sleiman, 2009).
3.5.2.1 Description of the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study
In the case of the Lakeview Lumber Inc, the management had committed fraud in
order to get bonuses built on net profits, so that the case would contain elements of the
fraud-triangle as defined by SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2002). Therefore, participants had to
assign either a high or low fraud risk valuation. For the purpose of this study, the
researcher revised Lindberg's (1999) case as described below.
As data collection for this study took place in 2015, the years of the financial
statements in the case were altered from 2006 audited, 2007 audited, and 2008 unaudited,
to 2011 audited, 2012 audited, and 2013 unaudited, and the modification in the accounts
of bad debt and warranty provisions were for the year 2013.
The case’s financial statements3 were also adjusted, particularly in the high-risk
scenario, where both the bad debt provisions and the product warranties were altered to
show that these accounts were intentionally understated to inflate the reported net profits.
According to SAS No. 99, examples of fraud risk factors include significant portions of
their compensation, such as bonuses, stock options, and earn-out arrangements being
contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial
position, or cash flow’4 (AICPA, 2002). For the low risk scenario, the accounts were
modified but not understated, and these accounts were made comparable to the audited

3

The financial statements were adapted from Lindberg (1999).

4

Management incentive plans may be contingent upon achieving targets only to certain accounts or selected
activities of the entity, even though the related accounts or activities may not be material to the entity
(AICPA, 2002).
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financial statements of the previous two years.
In the high-risk scenario, the bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was
approximately 3 percent for FY2013, whereas in the previous two years it was 5.0 percent
for both FY2012 and FY2011. However, in the low risk scenario the bad debts expense
as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 4.7 percent for FY2013, and in the
previous two years was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011. Given that the
geographic location for this study was the FAD, the currency was changed from US
Dollars to UAE Dirhams (AED) to make it easier for the participants to understand.
In addition, different information was given to the participants concerning the
management team (controller, accounting manager), managerial compensation and
accounting environment.

For instance, participants in the high fraud risk scenario

received the information that the controller, John, usually arrives at work in his Ferrari
sports car and that he and his wife have recently taken out a loan to purchase a new home
in an elegant neighbourhood. In contrast, in the low risk scenario participants received
the information that the controller, John, usually arrives at work in his old car and he and
his wife have recently been saving money to remodel their old home.
The case includes the following: (1) background information on the company; (2)
key personnel and the managerial compensation schedule; (3) the accounting
environment of the company; (4) currently unresolved audit issues involving bad debt
provisions and product warranties; and (5) the company's reported financial statements.
Half of the government auditors with high forensic skills, selected randomly, were
presented with a high fraud risk scenario and the other half with a low fraud risk scenario.
Similarly, half of the auditors with low forensic skills were presented with the same high
fraud case and the half low forensic skills auditors were presented low fraud risk
scenarios. After the participant had examined the updated Lakeview Lumber Inc. case,
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government auditors were presented with a set of questions related to the examined case
(either a low fraud risk scenario or a high fraud risk scenario). For each question the
respondent weighted his/her answer from 0 to 10. However, the researcher has used only
the results from three questions’ scores namely questions 5, 6 and 7 as a measure for fraud
risk valuation:
Question 5: Regarding the information you have reviewed about the case, how
probable do you think it is that fraud has occurred in Lakeview’s bad debt expense
account?
Question 6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about the case, how
probable do you think it is that fraud has occurred in Lakeview's product
warranties expense account?
Question 7: Considering the information you have reviewed about the case, what
is your evaluation of the total fraud risk for this customer?
According to Chui (2010) these are the questions that capture the level of
performance of the participants in assessing either a high fraud risk valuation or a low
risk valuation. The goal of this investigation was to compare the two groups: auditors
with high forensic accounting skills to auditors with low forensic accounting skills in
assessing both the high and low fraud risk scenarios.
This stage enabled the researcher to measure variable high/low fraud risk
valuation and classified the 96 respondent auditors into four groups:
Group 1: Auditors with high forensic skills assessed with a high fraud risk scenario (26
auditors).
Group 2: Auditors with low forensic skills assessed with a high fraud risk scenario (24
auditors).
Group 3: Auditors with high forensic skills assessed with a low fraud risk scenario (24
auditors).
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Group 4: Auditors with low forensic skills assessed with a low fraud risk scenario (22
auditors).
3.5.3 Stage III
In this stage, the investigation task consisted of a recall and memory recognition
exercise which was adapted from the research instrument of Kadous and Sedors (2004).
Participants were asked to perform a recall test by listing all the important information
from the Lakeview case. They were then instructed to complete a memory recognition
test that contained both factual and false positive statements (sentences indicating matters
that do not exist in the experimental case). Participants were required to evaluate the
statements and to indicate whether they remembered reading such information in the
investigational case. Specifically, they were instructed to respond by choosing either yes
(indicating that they remembered reading the information in the case) or no (indicating
that they did not remember reading such information in the case).
In this stage, the researcher measured variable auditors’ mental representation by
presenting the following tasks to the government auditors:
3.5.3.1 Recall task: Government auditors were asked to list the important information
that they could remember about the Lakeview case; the information stated was
categorised by the researcher as relating to either audit or to fraud issues.
3.5.3.2 Memory recognition task: Government auditors were also set a memory
recognition test consisting of true/false questions relevant to the Lakeview case. There
were ten statements in the memory recognition task: four statements - 1, 6, 8 and 10 were fraud related (for example, Lakeview has some slight issues with its accounting
system), four statements - 2, 4, 7 and 9 - were audit related (for example, all audit samples
were sustained by proper papers) and the remaining two statements - 3 and 5 - were false
sentences (for example, Lakeview gives its administration stock options as an inducement
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to meet earnings). No performance difference between the government auditors with
either high or low forensic accounting skills were expected in answering the false
sentences.
During this investigational Stage, four main variables are measured: Fraud recall
issues, Audit recall issues, Fraud memory issues and Audit memory issues.
The summary of the research variables as measured by the above three investigational
stages are listed in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Summary of the Research Variables.
N0

Variable Name

Measurement

Stage

Subjects

Stage I
1.a

Litigation forensic accounting skills

10 litigation questions

I

All auditors

1.b

Interrogation forensic accounting
skills
Forensic accounting skills

10 interrogation questions

I

All auditors

I

All auditors

II

26 auditors,
group 1

1.c
2.a

2.b

2.c

2.d

3.a.1
3.a.2
3.a.3
3.a.4
3.b.1
3.b.2
3.b.3
3.b.4

1.a+1.b
Stage II
High forensic skills auditors high Auditors with high forensic
fraud risk valuation
skill assessed with high
fraud risk scenario
High forensic skills auditors low
Auditors with high forensic
fraud risk valuation
skill assessed with low fraud
risk scenario
Low forensic skills auditors high
Auditors with low forensic
fraud risk valuation
skill assessed with high
fraud risk scenario
Low forensic skills auditors low
Auditors with low forensic
fraud risk valuation
skill assessed with low fraud
risk scenario
Stage III
Fraud recall by high forensic
auditors
Audit recall by high forensic
auditors
Fraud recall by low forensic
auditors
Audit recall by low forensic
auditors
Fraud memory by high forensic
auditors
Audit memory by high forensic
auditors
Fraud memory by low forensic
auditors
Audit memory by high forensic
auditors

skill

II

24 auditors,
group 3

II

24 auditors,
group 2

II

22 auditors,
group 4

III

skill

III
Recall task

skill

III

skill

III

skill

III

skill

III

skill

Memory recognition task

skill

III
III

50 auditors
group 1 + group 2
50 auditors
group 1 + group 2
46 auditors
group 1 + group 2
46 auditors
group 3+ group 4
50 auditors
group 1 +group2
50 auditors
group1 +group2
46 auditors
group1 +group2
46 auditors
group 3+group 4

3.c.1

Fraud recall issues

3.a.1+3.a.3

III

All auditors

3.c.2

Audit recall issues

3.a.2+3.a.4

III

All auditors

3.c.3

Fraud memory issues

3.b.1+3.b.3

III

All auditors

3.c.4

Audit memory issues

3.b.2+3.b.4

III

All auditors

3.5.4 Stage IV:
After the respondents – government auditors - had ended the investigational examination,
they were asked about: (i) gender, (ii) age, (iii) whether a participant had received training
in forensic accounting, and (iv) if the participants held a professional degree in forensic
accounting/fraud investigation. Besides, demographic information, the auditors had the
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opportunity to make comments concerning the task.
3.6 Population and Sample
The geographical location for the study was the Financial Audit Department
(FAD) located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The required sample size for the study
was determined through an examination using G*Power procedure. The sample size was
considered based on Cohen’s effect size. A control of 0.80 is normally utilised in
quantitative research to give compelling numerical outcomes (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and
Buchner, 2009), and a medium impact size was utilised as a part of the power
investigation with the goal that it was neither strict nor permissive. An a priori power
examination was conducted using the statistical test of linear regression analysis with two
predictors (forensic skills as an independent variable and mental representation as a
dependent variable), a statistical power of 0.8, a medium effect size of 0.15, and a level
of significance of 0.05, which produced a least sample size of 55 responses (see Appendix
A). This indicates that 55 different sets of data for the different study variables relating
to government auditors from the FAD represents the minimum sample size to attain the
required statistical power for a quantitative study of 80 percent. Therefore, a sample of
96 government auditors from the FAD was chosen to participate in this study.
G*Power software was utilised to determine the appropriate sample size, offering
an accessibility advantage, higher speed, and a lower cost to recruit sample study
participants (Coy, 2008). Also, this method of sampling was chosen because the study
participants needed to match a specific set of inclusion criteria for them to be eligible for
participation in the study.
3.7 Study Participants
Financial Audit Department in Dubai (FAD) auditors were preferred as the study
population because they undertake financial audit tasks for the following: (Financial
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Audit Department, 2013):
•

Government Departments, Public Corporations and Establishments, and
Authorities including Free Zone Authorities and any other entity belonging to the
Government.

•

Companies wholly owned by the Government or Companies in which the
Government’s share is not less than 25 percent.

•

Companies that the Government guarantees a minimum limit of profit, or any
entity for which the Government provides a financial subsidy.

•

Any other entity or project, the Ruler or the Chairman of the Executive Council
assigns to the Department the Audit of its accounts.

In addition, the use of government auditors as the population for this study was
consistent with the point of view of Peecher and Solomon (2001) and Libby et al. (2002).
On the both studies, they prompted examiners to attach themes to the targets of the study.
The principal goal of this study was to examine how forensic accounting skills affect audit
performance in fraud risk valuation.
3.8 Research Method and Design
A quantitative methodology was appropriate for investigating the research
questions, as it employs a mathematical approach to the collection and analysis of data.
Quantitative methodology is used to measure the research objectives mathematically,
through collecting information from a large sample, using survey methods and utilising
mathematical models (Gilbert, 2001). This study used a quantitative method since this
‘asks specific, narrow questions to obtain measurable and observable data on variables’.
In contrast, a qualitative method discovers broad, general questions correlated to a central
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phenomenon and necessitates the analysis of the data for descriptions (Creswell, 2005).
A quantitative research approach is appropriate when the intent is ‘a description
of trends or an explanation of the relationship among variables’. The second emphasis of
quantitative research includes collecting data that measures attributes of individuals
(Creswell, 2005). The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a
substantial difference in the fraud risk assessment and mental representation of
government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting skills. The study also
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between forensic accounting
skills and fraud risk valuation by government auditors.
This study tested the hypotheses by varying both forensic accounting skills (either
high or low skill) and fraud risk evaluation (either high or low) at both stages. Research
participants were assigned to either high or low forensic accounting skills, depending on
their results from the sections of the questionnaire that tested their forensic accounting
skills in both litigation and interrogation. Also the researcher manipulated the fraud risk
valuation by providing participants with a case scenario.

The complete research

instrument is presented in Appendices D and E.
3.9 Data Collection Procedure
3.9.1 Informed Consent
The consent form stated the research title and purpose of the study and is shown
in Figure 3.1. The form also stated that the names of the research participants would
remain anonymous, and that participants would be able to complete the survey at their
place of work and at a time convenient to them (Appendix B). Respondents had the
opportunity to withdraw from the study at any time during the data collection process by
discontinuing the questionnaire.
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I have been given information about the study entitled "Skills Of
Forensic Accounting and Fraud Risk Assessment" and debated the research
plan with the investigator Abdulla Yaser Amiri, who is conducting this
research as part of his Doctor of Business Administration degree, supervised
by Dr. Munir Lutfi (Business and Management Department); Dr. Tchan Latif
(Engineering and Information Sciences Department) at the University of
Wollongong in Dubai.
I have been directed of the possible risks associated with this research,
and been informed that any data personally linked to my responses will be
removed. I have had the opportunity to ask Abdulla Yaser Amiri any questions
I may have around the research and my partaking.

Figure 3.1: Consent statement

3.9.2 Pilot Testing
Pilot studies are essential to the examination procedure (Van Teiijlingen, Rennie,
Hundley, and Graham, 2001). According to Saunders et al. (2009), a pilot study allows
an investigator to test a questionnaire’s validity and the likely reliability of the
information that will be collected. The research instrument was pilot tested using 20
government auditors, with the aim of ensuring that the examination categorisation (high
forensic accounting skills and low forensic accounting skills), as well as the high and low
fraud risk scenarios, operated as planned. The result of the pilot test confirmed that they
were as planned.
In the light of the results of the pilot study, some amendments were made to the
investigational instrument. Alterations were made to the arrangement of the precise types
of information to be remembered by the government auditors in the recall assignment and
in the phrasing of the questionnaire. It was predicted that government auditors with low
70

forensic accounting skills would be likely to concentrate on whether a matter was
recorded using an appropriate audit track, and if there were any substantial misstatements.
Regarding government auditors with high forensic accounting skills their focus was
predicted to be on whether a matter had really occurred, and if there were any
misstatements in the financial statements. Thus, it was anticipated that government
auditors with high forensic accounting skills would recall fewer materiality-related items
compared to those with low forensic accounting skills, while government auditors with
low forensic accounting skills would recall more audit-related items than those with high
forensic accounting skills (Chui, 2010).
The pilot study provided the author with very important feedback. According to
the pilot study outcomes, a correction was made for the wording and nature of information
for assessing recall by government auditors. In addition, one more case fact was added.
The revised information categories in the recall task were audit-related issues, fraudrelated issues, and case-related issues. No performance differences between the
governments auditors with either high or low forensic accounting skills were expected for
the case-related issues. In addition, based on the comments received from participants,
the wording of the questionnaire was simplified so that it could be understood by all
participants.
3.10 Data Collection
Initially, potential participants were approached and informed about the project
via a letter from the head of the FAD. Subsequently, the researcher sent an e-mail
message to the study respondents clarifying how the results of the survey would be used,
the importance of the project for on-going social change, and the duration of the current
research. The e-mail message described the statistics gathering timeline, the process for
completing the examinations, the need for truthful evaluations, and an approximation of
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the amount of time the survey would take. The e-mail message also expressed gratitude
to the study respondents for their participation.
Data were downloaded into a Microsoft Excel format for analysis using the SPSS
statistical analysis software programme. Data were saved on a password protected
UOWD computer, which was backed up to the UOWD servers. The researcher was the
only person with access to the data. The data will be held until this thesis has been
examined, and then deleted, although it will remain on the UOWD server for five years.
The investigations of the research framework had four stages. During stage 1
forensic accounting skills (the independent variable) were measured via questions
concerning both litigation and interrogation forensic accounting skills. In stage 2 fraud
risk valuation (the dependent variable) was measured through an experimental case
concerning the company Lakeview Lumber Inc. In stage 3, the potential mediator
variable for fraud mental representation and audit mental representation were measured
on participants performing a recall task requiring them to list all of the significant
information that they could recall about the Lakeview case; further measuring of the
mediator variable, mental representation, was undertaken and participants undertook a
memory recognition assessment containing true-or-false enquiries related to the
Lakeview case study. Finally, stage 4 consisted of demographic enquiries.
3.11 Ethical Considerations
Several steps were taken to ensure that ethical procedures were followed during
this study. All information collected was kept confidential, and all participants were
treated equally, with respect paid to individual values and beliefs.

In addition,

participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time. Informed consent was
obtained from all the respondents prior to taking part in the study. The researcher gave
the participants information about how the data would be used and what would be done
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with the case materials. The University of Wollongong Research Ethics Committee
approved the study; ethics number HE13/246 (Appendix C).
3.12 Summary
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a significant
difference in the fraud risk assessment and mental representation of government auditors
who had low and high forensic accounting skills. The study also examined the role of
mental representation in the relationship between the forensic accounting skills and fraud
risk assessment of government auditors. The sample were government auditors from the
FAD located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The data for the study were collected using
survey instruments.

The study variables are the independent variable of forensic

accounting skills, the dependent variable of total fraud risk assessment, and the mediator
of mental representation. The data analyses conducted are an independent T-test and
Pearson correlation analysis and regression analysis to test hypotheses one and two and
regression analysis following the steps of Baron and Kenny (1986) to test hypothesis
three. Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESULTS and ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter delivers a comprehensive description of the outcomes after using the
investigational instrument with government auditors in Dubai. It contains descriptive
statistics of the participants and measured variables, correlation between litigation and
interrogation skills of forensic accounting, testing hypothesis H1, testing hypothesis H2,
testing hypothesis H3, and testing Mediation.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Demographic Data
A total of 96 Dubai government auditors participated in this study and the research
instrument was administered at the Financial Audit Department.

Demographic

information relating to the government auditors is shown in Table 4.1.
Number of participants

N = 96
Male: N=36; 37.5%

Gender

Female: N=60; 62.5%
Mean= 34.32

Age

SD= 6.22

Participants with training in forensic

N=25; 26%

accounting
Participants with professional degree in

N= 18; 18.75%

forensic accounting/fraud investigation

Table 4.1: Summary of Sample Statistics

Male respondents signified a smaller proportion of the sample (37.5 percent, n =
36) than female (62.5 percent, n = 60). The average age of the respondents (government
auditors) was 34.32 years old (SD = 6.22). 73.9 percent of the participants had no
previous forensic accounting/fraud or investigation training and only 18.75 percent of the
participants had a professional degree in forensic accounting/fraud investigation.
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Stage I measured variables
Government auditors are classified either as having high or low forensic
knowledge based on the aggregate of the total litigation and the total interrogation scores.
50 auditors were classified as possessing high forensic knowledge and 46 auditors with
low forensic knowledge. Table 4.2 below presents the average scores of the measured
variable for both type of auditors:
Table 4.2: Average Scores of Forensic Accounting Skills
Skill Category

Auditors with high forensic skills

Auditors with low forensic skills

Litigation

6.90

3.91

Interrogation

9.08

2.65

The correlation between litigation and interrogation scores is 0.77 for Spearman using
ranked data and 0.84 for Pearson. Hence the two variables’ scores were aggregated into
a single variable.
4.3.1 Forensic skill categorised by gender
36 out of 60 females (57 percent) are classified as auditors with a high forensic skill
compared with 20 males out of 46 (44 percent). A Box plot shown in Figure 4.1 (a)
reveals that the median in forensic knowledge skills is higher for females than males. The
box plot in figure 4.1 (b) reveals that the median in forensic skills is much higher for those
auditors with age greater than 36. Thus, as expected the more the age, the more experience
in forensic accounting the more forensic skills.
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Figure 4.1: Box Plot Comparing Forensic Accounting Skills as function of Gender and Age

4.4 Analysis of Hypothesis: H1

Figure 4.2: Research Framework Hypothesis 1

As depicted in Figure 4.2, hypothesis H1 tests the researcher’s prediction that
forensic accounting skills will have a direct influence on fraud risk assessment:
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills assess significantly higher the
likelihood of fraud in both high and low fraud risk scenarios (bad debt expense and
product warranties expense accounts).
Hypothesis H1 is extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows:
H1(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure
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fraud risk in a high fraud risk scenario higher than government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills.
H1(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure
fraud risk in low fraud risk scenario higher than government auditors with low forensic
accounting skills.
Two independent-sample T-tests were conducted: The first one compares the
assessment means in high fraud risk scenarios between the two groups of auditors (group
1 and group 2). The second T-test is conducted to compare the assessment means in low
fraud risk scenarios between the two groups of auditors (group 3 and group 4). The results
shown in Table 4.3. confirm the two sub-hypotheses H1a and H1b and hence H1 is
confirmed with a high significance(p=0.000).
Table 4.3. T-tests Results: Fraud Risk Valuation (High and Low Fraud Risk
Scenarios).

Assessment type

Auditors with high
forensic skills

Auditors with low
forensic skills

T-stat
value

Sig.

Hypothesis

High fraud risk
valuation

Group 1 auditors
9.23 (N=26, s=.60)

Group 2 auditors
6.53 (N=24, s=1.30)

9.53

0.000**

H1a
confirmed

Low fraud risk
valuation

Group 3 auditors
7.51 (N=24,s=0.73)

Group 4 auditors
4.30 (N=22, s=0.73)

14.87

0.000**

H1b
confirmed

* significance at 0.05; ** significance at 0.01, factor: forensic accounting skills

A further analysis is done using two regressions. First, the variable high fraud
risk valuation was regressed on the auditors (group 1 and group 2); the results of the first
regression as reported in table 4.4 produced R² = .65, F (1, 48) = 90.89, p=.000 showing
that there is a significant relationship between high fraud risk valuation and whether the
auditors was categorised as having a high or a low forensic skill level.
Then, the variable low fraud risk valuation was regressed on the auditors (group
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3 and group 4); the results of the first regression reported in Table 4.5 produced R² = .83,
F (1, 44) = 221.28, p=.000 showing that there is a significant relationship between low
fraud risk valuation and whether the auditors were categorised as having a high or a low
forensic skill level.

Table 4.4. Regression Results High Fraud Risk Valuation:
Auditors with High Forensic Skill vs Auditors with Low Forensic Skills.
Variable

Coefficient

T-statistics

Constant

6.53

31.93

Group 1

2.70

9.53

Sig.

0.000

Dependent variable: high fraud risk valuation

Variable

Table 4.5 Regression Results: Low Fraud Risk Valuation:
Auditors with High Forensic Skill vs Auditors with Low Forensic Skills.
Coefficient
T-stat value
Sig.

Constant

4.30

25.59

group 3

3.21

14.87

0.000

Dependent variable: low fraud risk valuation

Regression results in Table 4.4 reveal that there is on average a difference of
2.7/10 in high fraud risk valuation between the auditors of group 1 and 2. Similarly, the
regression results in Table 4.5 reveal that there is on average a difference of 3.2/10 in low
fraud risk valuation between the auditors of group 3 and group 4.
4.5 Analysis of Hypothesis: H2

Figure 4.3. Research Framework -Hypothesis 2
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Hypothesis 2 measures the second linkage in the research framework as depicted in
Figure 4.3 testing the researcher’s prediction that government auditors who are primed
with high forensic accounting skills will develop a mental representation in a different
way to those auditors with low forensic accounting skills. Hypothesis 2 breaks into four
sub-hypotheses:
H2(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a
fraud mental representation, as measured by a recall task, higher than government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a
fraud mental representation, as measured by a memory recognition task, higher than
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(c): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an
audit mental representation, as measured by a recall task, lower than government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
H2(d): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an
audit mental representation, as measured by a memory recognition task, lower than
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.

Four statistical t-tests were conducted to compare the two groups of auditors on the
four variables related to mental representation. The results of the four t-tests reported in
Table 4.6 reveal that in the case of fraud issues (in both recall and memory recognition),
auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly higher than
auditors with lower forensic accounting skills (4.20 vs.1.08 p=0.00 for recall; and 3.32
vs. 2.37 p=0.00 for memory recognition). This confirms H2a and H2c.
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Table 4.6. t-tests for Comparing the Two Groups of Auditors Means on the Four Variables
Related To Mental Representation.
Variable

Fraud recall
issues
Audit recall
issues
Fraud memory
recognition issues
Audit memory
recognition issues

Auditors with
high forensic
accounting
skills (N=50)
4.20 (1.47)

Auditors with
low
forensic
accounting
skills (N=46)
1.08 (0.78)

1.58 (0.88)

t-stat
value

p-value

Hypothesis

(

12.78

0.00**

2.80 (0.83)

-6.94

0.00**

3.32 (.47)

2.37 (0.67)

8.024

0.00**

2.26 (.49)

3.87 (0.34)

-18.61

0.00**

H2a
confirmed
H2b
confirmed
H2c
confirmed
H2d
confirmed

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Between parentheses are standard deviations

However, on audit issues (in both recall and memory recognition), auditors with high
forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly lower than auditors with high
forensic accounting skills (1.58 vs. 2.8, p=0.00 for recall and 2.26 vs. 3.87, p=0.00 for
memory recognition). This confirms hypotheses H2b and H2d.
4.6 Analysis of Hypothesis: H3
Hypothesis 3, as highlighted in Figure 4.4, predicts that those with a high mental
representation in fraud issues would assess higher in both low and high fraud risk
scenarios. Further, H3 predicts that those with a high mental representation in audit issues
would assess lower in both low and high fraud risk scenarios. So, Hypothesis 3 breaks
into two sub-hypotheses:
H3(a): Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will
assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental
representation in fraud issues.
H3(b): Government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will
assess fraud risk valuation lower than government auditors with high mental
representation in fraud issues.
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Figure 4.4 Research Framework -Hypothesis 3

To test H3(a) and H3(b), the researcher had conducted two single multiple
regressions where the dependent variable is the aggregated score of the auditors in
assessing both high and low fraud risk case scenarios. The first regression independent
variable is the mental representation aggregated score on fraud issues (recall + memory
recognition). The second regression independent variable is the mental representation
aggregated score on audit issues (recall + memory recognition). To confirm H3(a), a
significant positive regression coefficient is expected and to confirm H3(b) a significant
negative coefficient is expected. Conducting only one single multiple regression is
avoided because of a high multi-colinearity due to a high negative correlation between
the two independent variables (=-0.7).
As shown in Table 4.7, regression results R² = 0.38, F (1, 94) = 57.85, p=0.000
confirms H3(a). The second regression results R² = 0.21, F (1, 94) = 24.36, p=0.000
confirms H3(b).

Table 4.7. Effect of Mental Representation on Fraud Risk Valuation
Model

Independent variable

Coef.

t-stat

Sig.

Hypothesis

value

I

Mental Representation Fraud Issues

7.62

7.61

0.000

H3a confirmed

II

Mental Representation Audit Issues

-1.56

-4.9

0.000

H3b confirmed

Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation (low and high fraud risk scenarios)
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4.7 Analysis of Hypothesis: H4
In this section, the mental representation mediation effect between forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk assessment is tested. If mediation is confirmed, then there
is no direct effect between auditors’ forensic skill and their fraud risk valuation in both
case scenarios (low fraud issues and high fraud issues). Mediation is tested according to
the following four conditions which Baron and Kenny (1986) identify as necessary for
mediation to occur:
1. The independent variable, forensic accounting skills, must be significantly related to
the dependent variable, fraud risk valuation. Path (H1) represents this relationship.
Already tested.
2. The independent variable, forensic accounting skills, must be significantly related to
the mental representation (recall and memory recognition) as being a possible
mediator. Path (H2) represents this relationship. Already tested.
3. The mental representation (recall and memory recognition) must be significantly
related to the dependent variable, fraud risk valuation. Path (H3) represents this
relationship. Already tested.
4. The effect of the independent variable, forensic accounting skills, on the dependent
variable, fraud risk valuation, must be significantly less after controlling for mental
representation (recall and memory recognition) as a possible mediator.

Conditions 1, 2 and 3 have already been tested and confirmed. Condition 4 is tested
for both Fraud and Audit issues separately by conducting two multiple regressions. The
dependent variable is the fraud risk valuation in both regressions. In the first regression,
the two independent variables are forensic skills and the mental representation in Fraud
issues which produced R² = .64, F (2, 93) = 82.6, p=.000 and reported in Table 4.8

82

Table 4.8 Testing Mediation of Mental Representation Fraud Issues
Independent Variable

Coef.

t-stat

Sig.

value
Const

9.982

Forensic skill

.840

7.585

0.000

Mental representation fraud issues

.247

1.107

.271

No mediation

Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation

The above results reveal that still there is a significant relationship between
forensic skills and fraud risk valuation (Coef=.84, t-stat=7.5, p=0.000). This proves that
the relationship between auditors’ forensic skill and fraud risk valuation is direct and there
is no apparent support for a mediation.
In the second multiple regression that was performed to support the previous
results, the two independent variables, forensic skills and mental representation in audit
issues, produced R² = .61, F (2, 93) = 75.1, p=.000 as reported in Table 4.9 and reveal
that there is still a significant relationship between forensic skills and fraud risk valuation
(Coef=1.136, t-stat=10.6, p=0.000).
Table 4.9 Testing Mediation of Mental Representation Audit Issues
Independent Variable

Coef.

t-stat

Sig.

value
Const

3.669

Forensic Skill

1.136

10.6

0.000

Mental Representation Audit Issues

.826

2.663

.009

No mediation

Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation

This demonstrates again that the relationship between forensic skills and fraud
risk valuation is direct and there is no obvious support for a mediation.

4.8 Summary
The purpose of this quantitative research study was to examine the effects of
forensic accounting skills on fraud risk assessment.
For Hypothesis 1, the results of the analysis showed that government auditors with
high forensic accounting skills assessed fraud risk assessment higher in both high and low
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fraud risk scenarios than government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
For Hypothesis 2, the results of the analysis showed that government auditors with
high forensic accounting skills developed a mental representation that is different from
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
For Hypothesis 3, the results show that government auditors with a high fraud
mental representation would have a better fraud risk valuation. Further, the results show
that government auditors with high audit mental representation would have a lower fraud
risk valuation (in both low and high fraud case scenarios) than auditors with low audit
mental representation.
For Hypothesis 4, analysis showed that mental representation does not mediate
the relationship between forensic skill and fraud risk valuation. Therefore, the
relationship between the two variables is direct and not through mental representation.
Chapter 5 covers a further discussion of the results presented in this chapter. The
hypotheses will be reviewed and the potential implications for each of the results of the
analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE – DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
Lately, a series of frauds have been committed in both the public and private
sectors. According to Dubai’s police chief, Dhabi Khalfan Tamim, dishonesty and
deception within Dubai’s state-linked companies is very high, and tough new forfeits will
be imposed on violators. A recently issued declaration gives the power to apply prison
terms of up to 20 years for criminals. The Government also extended financial rules in
the wake of its debt crisis. However, analysts have noted that regulation in Dubai has
failed to keep up with the rapid growth in business (Sleiman, 2009).
Because of the number preponderance of scandals involving fraudulent practices,
detecting fraud has become a high priority within the accounting profession (Salem,
2012). Determining and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not always
feature in the training and knowledge of auditors. Auditors have the capability to detect
fraud, but they often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to translate this information
into a plan that can aid in the future identification of risk factors for fraudulent activities
(Boritz et al., 2014).
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a significant
difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation of government auditors
who had low and high forensic accounting skills. The study also examined the role of
mental representation in the connection between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk
valuation of government auditors. This exploration would enrich the knowledge of
auditors, through raising awareness of the importance of skills in forensic accounting,
which in turn could enhance their ability when conducting a fraud risk assessment.
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5.2 Summary and Interpretation of the Findings
5.2.1 Research Question 1
For this research question, government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills scored an average of (M=9.23) in a high fraud risk scenario; significantly higher
than those with low forensic accounting skills, who scored on average (M=6.53). This
confirms hypothesis H1(a). Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills
scored an average of (M= 7.51) in a low fraud risk scenario; significantly higher than
those with low forensic accounting skills, who scored on average (M=4.30). This
confirms hypothesis H1(b). As a result, Table 4.3 confirms the two sub-hypotheses H1
(a) and H1 (b) and hence H1 is confirmed with a high significance (p=0.000) which
confirms the main hypothesis H1, that government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills will assess fraud risk valuation higher in both high and low fraud risk scenarios
compared to government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
The results of the data analysis indicated that auditors with low forensic
accounting skills assessed fraud risk lower than those with high forensic accounting skills.
These results confirmed previous literature that suggests that auditors are usually poor
evaluators of fraud risk (Cushing et al., 1995; Knapp and Knapp, 2001; Allen et al., 2006),
especially those with low forensic accounting skills. Auditors are not conventionally
trained to handle fraud assessment because of the specialised training and advanced
knowledge required for these tasks (Asare et al., 2015). The outcomes of the study
indicated that government auditors who lack forensic accounting skills are likely to
perform poorly in conducting fraud assessments.
The results also confirmed Jaffar et al.’s (2008) statement that in a high fraud risk
situation, an auditor’s capability to assess fraud risk has a positive effect on their ability
to detect the likelihood of fraud. In a low fraud risk scenario, an auditor’s capability to
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measure fraud risk has a negative effect on their ability to detect the likelihood of fraud.
The results of this study showed that both auditors with high forensic accounting skills
and those with low forensic accounting skills assessed lower in the low fraud risk
scenarios than in the high fraud risk scenarios. These findings suggest that high technical
skills are needed from government auditors, similar to the skills of forensic accountants,
when faced with a scenario where the likelihood detection of fraud is considered low. In
situations where the existence of fraud is high and rampant, the level of skills of
government auditors in conducting fraud assessment may be sufficient.
Based on the theoretical framework of the fraud diamond theory (Wolfe and
Hermanson, 2004), the results of the study confirm the importance of perceived
opportunity to commit fraud in an organisation. The perception of apparent opportunity
suggests that persons will take advantage of the conditions available to them (Kelly and
Hartley, 2010). The tendency for many government auditors to have low forensic skills
is an opportunity that can foster fraud in an organisation.
5.2.2 Research Question 2
For this research question, the outcomes from the recall tasks and the score of the
memory recognition tasks were used. The government auditors’ responses were grouped
into three categories: audit-related issues, fraud-related issues and case fact issues. The
results supported the hypothesis: government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills will develop a mental representation that is dissimilar from that of government
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.
The results of t-tests in Table 4.6 reveal that on fraud issues (in both recall and
memory recognition), government auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on
average significantly higher than government auditors with lower forensic accounting
skills (4.20/1.08 for recall and 3.32/2.37 on memory recognition). These results confirm
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H2(a) and H2(c). However, on audit issues (in both recall and memory recognition),
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly
lower than government auditors with high forensic accounting skills (1.58/2.8 for recall
and 2.26/3.87 on memory recognition). These results confirm H2(b) and H2(d).
As a result, Table 4.6 confirms the four sub-hypotheses H2(a); H2(b); H2(c);
H2(d) and hence H2 is confirmed with a high significance (p=0.000) which, in turn,
confirms the main hypothesis H2 that government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills will develop a mental representation that is different from government auditors with
low forensic accounting skills.
The results of the study confirmed previous literature that states that auditors and
forensic investigators have different mental representations regarding fraud. In the
study’s case, although government auditors were the only participants, the groups differed
in skill set. As discussed in the literature review, auditors and forensic investigators differ
in their forensic accounting skills. According to Harris and Brown (2000, p. 6), ‘a
forensic accountant possesses skills exceeding those of a traditional auditor and provides
services beyond the scope of a typical financial audit engagement.’
A forensic auditor also looks for many other matters related to fraud discovery,
including identifying income before it is received or recording fictitious revenues, shifting
revenue to other periods, and not disclosing obligations owed by a corporation (Crumbley
and Apostolou, 2002). Forensic accountants are then often called in to investigate and
resolve concerns that financial misstatements may be indicative of fraud (Golden et al.,
2006). The results of the study highlight the difference between government auditors and
forensic accountants in the mental representation of fraud and the processes employed in
detecting fraud. The differences in mental representation are a possible reflection of the
difference in skill level and scope of knowledge between government auditors and
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forensic accountants.
The differences in mental representation of fraud between auditors and forensic
investigators could explain the differences in the level of skill in assessing fraud. The
results of the study suggest that these differences in mental representation of fraud
possibly create an environment where employees have the opportunity to commit fraud.
The corporate culture of companies influences the effect of the components of the fraud
diamond theory (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004) in the occurrence of fraud (Schuchter and
Levi, 2016). Corporate culture can influence whether fraud is perpetrated or more antifraud behaviours are encouraged (Davis and Pesch, 2013).
5.2.3 Research Question 3
For this research question, the results from table 4.7 reveals that there is a
significant positive regression coefficient between mental representation and fraud issues
(t-value = 7.61) which confirms H3(a), and a significant negative coefficient between
mental representation and audit issues (t-value = - 4.9) which confirms H3(b). As a result,
table 4.7 confirms the two sub-hypotheses H3(a); and H3(b); and hence H3 is confirmed
with a high significance (p=0.000) which, in turn, confirms the main hypothesis H3 that
Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will assess fraud
risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental representation in fraud
issues, whereas, government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will
assess fraud risk valuation lower than auditors with high mental representation in fraud
issues.
5.2.4 Research Question 4
For this research question, the results in table 4.7 reveals that there is a significant
relationship between forensic skills and fraud risk valuation (Coef=.84, t-stat=7.5,
p=0.000). This proves that the relationship between auditors’ forensic skill and fraud risk
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valuation is direct and there is no support for a mediation.
The results of the study suggested that there is a direct relationship between
forensic skill and fraud risk valuation and mental representation does not mediate this
relationship, which doesn’t support previous research studies (Chui, 2010; Boritz et al,
2014)
According to Boritz et al (2014), mental representations of fraud can influence an
accountants’ ability to conduct fraud assessments. When mental representations are
applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants appear to be more skilled than
government auditors in effective fraud risk assessment.
Boritz et al. (2014) suggests that the format of mental representation of auditors
can affect their ability to assess risk. The quantity of domain-specific knowledge
influences the content and quality of an individual’s mental representations (Larkin, 1983;
Glaser, 1984).

The results of the study confirmed the explanation of mental

representation, as it was found that government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills tend to form mental representations that are qualitatively different from those of
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. The difference in their forensic
accounting skills led to the difference in their mental representation. The analysis of the
findings is that forensic accounting skills create a mental representation that enhances
effectiveness in conducting fraud assessments and investigations.
With regard to the theoretical framework, specifically the importance of
opportunity in committing fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004), the results of the study
suggest that mental representations play an important role in the ability of experts to
assess and identify fraud. The perpetration of fraud is likely to continue in the absence
of the necessary processes to detect fraud within organisations, underscoring the
importance of accurate mental representations of fraud (Lenz et al., 2016; Schuchter and
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Levi, 2016).
As the current study doesn’t reveal the impact of the assumed mediation factor,
mental representation, the lack of impact may be due to the current research design. Also,
there could be other mediating variables that the current research hasn’t captured, such as
mind set, knowledge and experience. Studying the impact of the three possible mediating
variables represents future research opportunities.

5.3 Implications of Findings
This study makes several significant contributions.

From a contribution to

knowledge perspective, this study is the first to examine how different skills in
forensic accounting affect fraud risk valuations. The researcher identifies the major
contributions of this study under three categories: theoretical; methodological; and
practical.
Amongst the theoretical contributions, this study has discussed and examined the
skills of forensic accounting within the context of organisations in Dubai. Moreover,
it has established the intervening variable of mental representation in the relationship
between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation. In addition, this study
proved the positive influence of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk valuation.
Methodological contributions include the unique use of respondents who are
government auditors (from Financial Audit Department in Dubai) instead of student
substitutes. Also, the study utilised the technique of G*Power software to determine
the appropriate sample size, offering an accessibility advantage, higher speed, and
lower costs in recruiting sample study participants (Coy, 2008).
On a practical level, this study revealed the value of forensic accounting skills as
a significant proficiency requirement in the work place. This study has the potential
to contribute to the Financial Audit Department, public prosecution, regulatory,
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organisations and lawful accounting and auditing firms.
In addition to the above contributions, the results add to the literature on
performance variations between different skills in forensic accounting, on fraud risk
task performance and on how to improve auditors’ response to fraud through forensic
accounting skills.
Based on the results of the fraud risk valuation, and from the perspective of
contribution to practice, auditors and companies will be able to identify ‘when and
where to concentrate their audit procedures’ (Gerson et al., 2006). Determining the
scope and depth of the audit procedures will enhance the possibility of detecting fraud
(Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges, 2011). If an inspection firm was to assess low risk in
high fraud risk scenarios, the firm would face the danger of being subject to major
penalties, including litigation, costly settlements, and loss of reputation (Palmrose,
1987). The results of this study can help auditors in financial audit departments to
improve their skills in forensic accounting and thereby their fraud detection
capability.
The findings that government auditors who have low forensic skills are more
likely to have low abilities to detect fraud imply an opportunity for fraud to occur in
government agencies. Rae and Subramanian (2008) highlighted that opportunity
refers to the capability and power of a member to recognise weaknesses within an
organisational system and to take advantage of these, making fraud probable.
Forensic experts handle fraud assessment because of the specialised training and
knowledge they have (Asare et al., 2015). Because auditors are not conventionally
trained to perform fraud assessment (Asare et al., 2015), more training appears to be
needed in order to improve their ability to assess and detect fraud in their
organisations.
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The study will also benefit both companies and future auditors, as there have been
signs that the future demand for auditing services will be reliant upon an auditor’s
ability to detect a fraud. As discussed previously, old-style auditing has a limited
capacity to detect deceitful practices, which the forensic accountants will effectively
fill. Thus, the results highlight a need for auditors to be trained in forensic accounting
skills.

Also, the implications of these findings are important to practitioners,

regulators, accounting researchers and educators, because SAS No. 99 requires
auditors to document the fraud-risks identified during an audit. Finally, this research
study and the results have revealed that more effort should be directed toward
providing training and enhanced forensic accounting skills to qualify as an auditor,
since detecting fraud has become a high priority within the accounting profession
(Elliott, 2002).

5.4 Limitations
All studies have limitations that affect the degree of generalisation of the findings
(Creswell, 2003), and this study is subject to some of confines.
This research’s results are constrained by using the Lakeview case tool: the fraud
scenario used to test Dubai government accountants’ fraud risk assessment performance.
The case study, Lindberg (1999), which has been used in this research, is a suitable tool
for evaluating government auditors’ fraud risk evaluation performance. The case was
reformed and adjusted to the purpose of this research. The case is very well known in the
literature. Fraud risk research papers, Carpenter et al., 2002 and Carpenter et al., 2008,
subsequently based their research on the same case.
The population and sample size bound the study results. Including other government,
auditors will yield additional results and will project the results at a wider scope. The
study was also restricted by having participants only who worked for the government.
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Auditors from the private sector were not included.
The sample size for the study was determined through an examination using
G*Power procedure (see Appendix A). The procedure indicated that a minimum sample
of 55 data sets is required for the different study variables. Therefore, a sample of 96
government auditors from the FAD was appropriate to participate in this study.

5.5 Recommendations
For researchers, one recommendation is to use a mixed-method research design
using both a survey and an interview (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) to raise the
number of respondents. It would also be desirable to replicate the present study using
different case scenarios and/or people. The current study utilised Dubai government
auditors as the study population, and future studies may wish to include internal and
external auditors from Dubai or the other Emirates.
Further, it is recommended, for future research, to use Dubai-based case scenarios
from Dubai Courts records and/or UAE courts.
As the private sector auditors were not part of the current research design, it would
also be useful to include auditors of the private sector as well. Rose et al., 2009 postulates
and argues that professional forensic accountants/auditors should have distinct education,
experience and knowledge structure to be able to handle their duties and responsibilities.
Thus, the relationships between forensic accounting skills, mental representation, and
knowledge structure, would be worthy of future research. It is recommended that further
studies should use a different populations and sampling methods, such as probability
sampling techniques.
To expand the literature on mental representation of fraud, future studies could
explore how these representations are different in terms of level of forensic assessment
skills. Future studies could explore how internal or non-governmental auditors who have
94

low forensic assessment skills view fraud compared to auditors who have high forensic
assessment skills.

This information could lead to deeper insights into the mental

representations that might be more effective in assessing fraud in organisations.
One policy recommendation that can help auditors improve their forensic
assessment skills is to be exposed to more training. Engaging in more specialised casebased training may be helpful in bridging the gap between the current forward-looking
skills of forensic experts and the limited skills of auditors to assess fraud (Asare et al.,
2015). Leaders of organisations can sponsor fraud assessment training to enhance the
skills of their auditors and possibly discourage an organisational culture where fraud is
widespread.
Finally, many respondents have shown high interest and enthusiasm in the
research topic an area. Many have asked to see the results and forward the concepts and
themes of the research to the higher-level Dubai authorities.

5.6 Summary
In conclusion, the study conducted was a quantitative study that aimed to examine
if there was a substantial difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation
of government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting skills. The study also
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between the forensic
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation of government auditors. The researcher
expected a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills to recall fewer
materiality-related items than an auditor with low forensic accounting skills. In addition,
it was expected that a government auditor with low forensic accounting skills would recall
more audit-related issues than those with high forensic accounting skills. For the memory
recognition test, it was expected that government auditors with high forensic accounting
skills would score higher for the fraud-related statements than those with low forensic
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accounting skills, while government auditors with low forensic accounting skills would
score higher for the audit-related statements than those with high forensic accounting
skills. In addition, it was expected that there would be no significant difference in
performance between these two forensic accounting groups regarding the false sentences.
The results confirmed the researcher’s hypotheses. Auditors with high forensic
accounting skills recalled more items and scored higher for fraud-related issues than those
with low forensic accounting skills. Auditors with low forensic accounting skills recalled
more items and scored higher for audit-related issues than those with high forensic
accounting skills, and there was no significant difference between the groups of
government auditors regarding the false sentences. The results also confirmed the subhypotheses for each research question.

Government auditors with high forensic

accounting skills assessed greater fraud risk in both the high and low fraud risk scenarios
than government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. Government auditors with
high forensic accounting skills developed a mental representation that was qualitatively
different from government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. Lastly, the
relationship between auditors’ forensic skills and fraud risk valuation is direct and there
is no support for a mediation. With the growing number of fraud cases in Dubai,
consideration of these results could be valuable in helping audit firms know where to
focus on improving their ability to detect fraud.
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Appendix B - Informed Consent Agreement

RESEARCH TITLE: Knowledge of Forensic Accounting and Performance of
Auditors: An Exploratory Study on Government of Dubai Auditors
RESEARCHER: Abdulla Yaser Amiri
I have been given information about "Knowledge of Forensic Accounting and
Performance of Auditors" and discussed the research project with researcher’s Abdulla
Yaser Amiri who is conducting this research as part of the award of the degree "Doctor
of Business Administration" supervised by Dr. Munir Lutfi (Business and Management
Department); Dr. Tchan Latif (Engineering and Information Sciences Department) at
the University of Wollongong in Dubai.
I have been advised of the potential risks and burdens associated with this
research, in which there are no known risks for me in this study, and have had an
opportunity to ask the researcher any questions I may have about the research and my
participation.
I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary, I am free to
refuse to participate and I am free to withdraw from the research at any time. My refusal
to participate or withdrawal of consent will not affect my treatment in any way /my
relationship with the Financial Audit Department or my relationship with the University
of Wollongong in Dubai.
If I have any enquiries about the research, I can contact (Abdulla Yaser Amirimobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email: abdullaamiri@gmail.com; supervisors: 1. Dr.
Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422; email: munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae. 2. Dr. Tchan Latif,
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009714/3900407; email: Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae ) or if I have any concerns or
complaints regarding the way the research is or has been conducted, I can contact the
Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Office of Research, University of
Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.

I understand that the data collected from my participation will be used for
purpose (e.g. thesis, journal publication, etc.), and I consent for it to be used in that
manner.
Signed

Date

.......................................................................

......./....../......

Name (please print)
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Appendix E - Questionnaire for the High Risk Scenario

Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Assessment Questionnaire
This questionnaire is anonymous and aims to measure forensic accounting skills by
Dubai government auditors; as well as, how they apply these skills during their fraud
risk assessment. It forms part of a larger Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)
project. The questionnaire is intended for Dubai government auditors. This will help
to ensure the findings from this project offer a fair representation of government
auditors as a whole. All answers will be anonymous and should take between 30 and
50 minutes to complete, depending on your answers.
Completing this questionnaire is voluntary and a decision not to participate will not
prejudice you in any way. If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue
participation at any time.
If you have any enquiries about the research, you can contact:
1. Abdulla Yaser Amiri- mobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email:
abdullaamiri@gmail.com.
2. Supervisors: 1. Dr. Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422; email:
munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae.
2. Dr. Tchan Latif, 009714/3900407; email:
Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae.
Or if you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has
been conducted, you can contact the Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics
Committee, Office of Research, University of Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email
rso-ethics@uow.edu.au.
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Investigation Instrument – Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Valuation

Part I –- Measuring forensic accounting skills
This part aims to examine your litigation and investigative skills of forensic accounting.
Litigation questions
1.

The forensic accountant’s work as an expert usually results in a written

report that typically includes all of the following except.

2.

a)

A plan for winning the case

b)

A computation of the damages

c)

The procedures followed in gathering information

d)

The procedures followed in computing the damages

The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be

introduced in court is:

3.

a)

The attorney or paralegal

b)

A private detective

c)

A fraud investigator

d)

None of the above

To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil

actions, the three basic elements that must be proven include all of the following
except:
a)

Proximate cause

b)

That damages were incurred with reasonable certainty

c)

That fraud was committed by the defendant

d)

That lost profits were foreseeable at the time the wrongful act
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was committed

4.

The crime of intentionally and permanently converting another's

property to one's own use is:

5.

a)

Burglary

b)

Embezzlement

c)

Robbery

d)

Fraud

SAS No.99, Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit,

requires that auditors report any evidence found that fraud may exist to which
of these?

6.

a)

Inventory accounts

b)

Cash accounts

c)

Financial reports

d)

All of the above

The fraud investigation process involves systematically gathering and

reviewing evidence for the purpose of
a)

Providing proof in court that a fraud has been committed

b)

Documenting the presence or absence of fraud

c)

Satisfying the requirements of SAS 99

d)

None of the above
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7.

Evidence is:
a)

Useful in court only if the plaintiff and defendant can agree on

its admissibility

8.

9.

b)

Allowed in court only if it is truthful

c)

Most useful if it is relevant, reliable, and valid

d)

Allowed if it passes the test of authenticity

Which of the following is not a basic rule of handling evidence?
a)

Keep documents in a secure location

b)

Maintain appropriate chain of custody information

c)

Handle original documents whenever possible

d)

All of the above are basic rules of handling evidence

Regarding the fraud investigation report, the investigator should:
a)

Assume it will be challenged in court

b)

Prepare a different report for the court

c)

Assume that the investigation report will be protected under

attorney-client privilege.
d)

10.

None of the above

The fraud reporting process can be defined as:
a)

The process of submitting reports to authorities and insurance

companies
b)

The process of documenting frauds committed

c)

The process of informing affected stakeholders

d)

None of the above
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Investigative questions

1.

In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the

following?
a)

Uses auditing and other investigative skills

b)

Prepares a written report that usually measures damages to an

injured party
c)

Analyses what actually happened and develops assumptions

about what would have happened
d)

2.

3.

All of the above

The forensic accountant’s core investigative skills are:
a)

Accounting and auditing skills

b)

Advanced computer skills

c)

Sophisticated statistical skills

d)

Interviewing skills

The advantages of going to the interviewee’s location is that:
a)

Relevant documents are likely to be located there

b)

Copies of documents can be made before the accountant leaves

c)

The accountant may be directed to a co-worker at the same

location for additional information
d)

All of the above apply
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4.

5.

6.

The primary objective in a fraud investigation should be to:
a)

Stop the fraud from continuing

b)

Make an example of the fraudster

c)

Punish the fraudster

d)

All of the above are possible primary objectives

When should interviews normally be conducted?
a)

Before documentary evidence is obtained

b)

After a preliminary draft of the fraud investigation report is ready

c)

Once a suspect can be identified

d)

None of the above

The correct order of questions to ask subjects who are not suspects is

best represented as:
a)

Introductory, assessment, informational, and concluding

b)

Introductory, informational, assessment, admission seeking, and

concluding

7.

c)

Introductory, informational, assessment, and admission seeking

d)

Introductory, informational, assessment, and concluding

During an interview, the interviewer should:
a)

Never show anger

b)

Never get angry

c)

Never show anger or get angry

d)

Get angry only if the crime is especially offensive
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8.

An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask:
a)

"When was the first time you took money from the register?"

b)

"You took the money because you needed to help your mother,

didn’t you?"

9.

c)

"You took the money, didn't you?"

d)

All of the above are appropriate ways to accuse a suspect.

When multiple persons are to be interviewed:
a)

Interview the least suspect persons first and then progress to the

most culpable.
b)

Interview them in a random order to reduce the likelihood of

bias.
c)

Interview the most suspect persons first and then progress to the

least suspect.
d)

10.

None of the above.

Subjects who are not guilty usually respond to assessment questions:
a)

Slowly, carefully considering the questions and the implications

of their answers.
b)

Without hesitation

c)

Indirectly, so that the interviewer has more information

d)

Reluctantly due to a desire to show kindness toward others
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Part II –– Case Scenario "The researcher have requested consent to use the case, and
the remaining parts of the instrument".
Background Information on Lakeview Lumber Inc.
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. is located in the city of Lakeview, a metropolitan area of
approximately 200,000 people. Lakeview Lumber sells between 30,000 and 35,000
different kinds of building materials, lawn and garden products, and home improvement
supplies to retail customers, as well as to contractors and other building professionals.
Retail customers are required to pay in cash or by a major credit card at the time of their
purchase. However, the vast majority of contractors and building professionals have
established credit accounts and are billed on a monthly basis.

You, as a government auditor, are assigned to assist Karen Rohan, the “in-charge”
auditor on the FY2013 Lakeview Lumber audit.

Key Personnel
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.’s top management team consists of the following key
executives. Based on your firm’s prior interaction with these key executives, you have
some basic knowledge of their background.

John Mosher – Controller
•

John has been the Controller for Lakeview Lumber since 1995. He

usually arrives at work with his Ferrari sport car. He and his wife have recently
taken out a loan to purchase a new home in an elegant neighbourhood.
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Terry James – Accounting Manager
•

Terry has a B.A. in accounting and has been with Lakeview Lumber for

four years. Prior to working for Lakeview Lumber, Terry was the night auditor
for a small hotel. Terry has extensive and detailed knowledge of the Lakeview
Lumber’s accounting systems as well as their weaknesses.
Managerial Compensation
•

Lakeview Lumber, Inc. compensates its key personnel primarily through

a fixed salary schedule. In a recent board meeting, Lakeview’s board of
directors approved the motion to award all key personnel a cash bonus at the
end of each year, starting in FY2013. Key personnel will receive a cash bonus
based on a predetermined percentage of the company’s reported net income.
Lakeview Lumber's Accounting Environment
Lakeview Lumber Inc. appeared to have some minor weaknesses in its accounting
systems. However, these weaknesses did not appear to allow material errors into the
company’s financial reporting process. Lakeview management reassured the auditors
that Lakeview will take appropriate actions to upgrade its accounting systems.
The Lakeview Lumber’s Audit
Karen, the current “in-charge” auditor is responsible for seeing that she completes the
field work for the Lakeview Lumber audit as soon as possible. Audit hours were
already over the time that had been budgeted for the job, and Karen believed that there
was still a substantial amount of time needed to finish the audit, because several audit
matters had not yet been resolved. Karen approached you with the following audit
issues regarding Bad Debts Expense and Product Warranties Expense for FY2013. She
would like you to review her analyses of these accounts and provide her with your
recommendations.
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Bad Debts Expense
Bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 3 percent for
FY2013, whereas in the prior two years bad debts expense as a percentage of credit
sales was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011. Credit sales for FY2013 were
about AED 2,600,000. Review and testing of the trail balance of accounts receivable
indicated that the amount and percentage of accounts receivable in each ccounting
period were comparable to prior years.

The percentages used to estimate the

uncollectable accounts were reduced by almost half in practically category compared
to the previous year.

When Karen questioned Terry James, the Accounting Manager, about the decreased
percentages, he stated that John Mosher, the Controller, had instructed him to use the
lower percentages for FY2013. Karen subsequently discussed the matter with John,
who informed Karen that he was expecting customers to pay more quickly in FY2014,
due to a better than expected growth of the housing market in the area in which
Lakeview Lumber does business.

Product Warranties Expense
Lakeview Lumber's warranty expense account for FY2013 was approximately AED
81,000 representing a 28 percent decrease from FY2012. Terry stated that the charge
to warranty expense was “just an estimate provided by John.” When Karen asked John
about the decrease in warranty provisions, John stated that the decrease was due to the
better than expected economic growth in the area. He explained that builders were less
particular in a stronger economic climate and they were less inclined to return wood
and supplies that might be slightly flawed. Karen then discussed product warranties
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with Adam Lester, the manager of the cabinets department, since that department
seemed to experience the largest number of returns. Adam stated that while he did not
keep records of returns per se, he would fill out the appropriate paperwork and forward
it to the accounting department. Adam said he didn't think that the returns during
FY2013 were much different from those of FY2012. Karen subsequently asked Terry
from the accounting department to provide her with a complete list of returns for
FY2013.
Karen sampled 30 transactions throughout FY2013. All of the sampled transactions
were supported by proper documentation.

Additional Analysis
In addition to the above information, Karen provided you with some preliminary
analysis of both the bad debts expense and the product warranties expense accounts
prepared by another audit staff member on the Lakeview audit.
The materiality level for the Lakeview Lumber Inc. audit has been set to approximately
1.0 percent of the company’s reported sales. The materiality level for FY2013 was
AED 52,020.

Bad debts expense:

Bad debts expense as
currently recorded

Amounts

Supporting calculations

AED 78,000

AED 2,600,000 FY2013 credit sales x
3%
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Bad debts expense (if

AED 130,000 AED 2,600,000 FY2008 credits sales x

applied the same percentage

5%

– 5.0% for both FY2012
and FY2011)
Potential understatement of
bad debts
Expense for FY2013

AED 52,000

AED 130,000 - AED 78,000

Less: Income taxes (@

AED 19,760

AED 52,000 x 38%

AED 32,240

AED 52,000 - AED 19,760

38%)
Potential decrease to
currently recorded net
income

Comment 1: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED
32,240 due to the bad debts expense account.

Product warranties expense:
Amounts
Warranty expense as

Supporting calculations

AED 81,000

currently recorded
Warranty expense (if

AED 119,646

(1) FY 2011 warranty expense

applied the same

percentage = warranty sales

Percentage - 2.3% for

=113,000 /4,876,000 = 2.3%
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FY2012)

(2) FY 2013 warranty = AED
5,202,000 x 2.3%

Potential
understatement of
warranty
Expense for FY2013

AED 38,646

AED 119,646 - AED 81,000

Less: income taxes (@ AED 14,685

AED 38,646 x 38%

38%)
Potential decrease to

AED 23,961

AED 38,646 - AED 14,685

currently recorded net
income

Comment 2: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED
23,961 due to the product warranties expense account.
Comment 3: The combined effect of both the bad debts expense and the product
warranties expense accounts may have overstated the Lakeview Lumber Inc.'s net
income by AED 56,201 (AED 32,240 + AED 23,961).
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Lakeview Lumber's Financial Statements
Lakeview Lumber's income statements for the past three fiscal years are presented in
Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 includes the statements of retained earnings for FY2011 through
FY2013. The balance sheets for Lakeview Lumber for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013
are shown in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 1
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.
Income Statements
(Amounts in thousands, except per share data)
FY2013

FY2012 FY2011

Unaudited

Audited Audited

(AED)

(AED)

(AED)

Sales

5,202

4,876

4,424

Cost of sales

3,451

3,359

3,101

Gross profit

1,751

1,517

1,323

Depreciation

184

174

169

Bad debts expense

78

125

118

Warranty expense

81

113

117

Other selling expense

575

465

342

Total selling expense

918

877

746

expenses

235

224

251

Total expenses

1,153

1,101

961

Income before tax

598

416

362

Income taxes

227

158

138

Net income

371

258

224

Earnings per share

3.71

2.58

2.24

General & administrative
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EXHIBIT 2
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.
Statements of Retained Earnings
(Amounts in thousands)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2010

AED 1,735

FY2011 (audited)
Add: Net income

224

Less: Dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2011

AED 1,859

FY2012 (audited)
Add: Net income

258

Less: Dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2012

AED 2,017

FY2013 (unaudited)
Add: Net income

371

Less: Dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2013

AED 2,288

End of Company Information
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Now that you have finished reviewing the information pertaining to Lakeview Lumber,
Inc., Karen would like to have you provide her with the following assessment:

Based on your evaluation of Lakeview Lumber, please rank the extent of your
agreement with the following statements on the scale below.

Q1: The Lakeview Bad Debt Expense account was fairly presented. Place an “X” at
the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly disagree

5

6

7

8

Neither

9

10

Strongly

disagree or agree

agree

Q2: How likely would you do the following in regard to the Lakeview Bad Debt
Expense account? Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Not likely at all to take further

5

6

7

8

Somewhat likely

9

10

Very likely

action to investigate
this account

Q3: The Lakeview Product Warranties Expense account was fairly presented. Place
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

Neither disagree or agree
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7

8

9

10

Strongly agree

Q4: How likely are you to do the following in regard to the Lakeview Product
Warranties Expense account? Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the
scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Not likely at all to take further

5

6

7

8

Somewhat likely

9

10

Very likely

action to investigate
this account

Q5: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how
likely do you think the existence of fraud in Lakeview’s Bad Debt Expense account?
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Very unlikely

5

6

7

8

Moderate

9

10

Very likely

Q6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how
likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview's Product Warranties Expense account?
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

Very unlikely

2

3

4

5

6

Moderate
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7

8

9

10

Very likely

Q7: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., what
is your assessment of the overall fraud risk for this client? Place an “X” at the
appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

Very low

2

3

4

5

6

moderate

137

7

8

9

10

Very high

Part III – Recall Task
In the space provided below please list all of the important information that you can
remember about Lakeview Lumber Inc. Write down the information in the order that
you remember it. Start a new line for each piece of information.
1.___________________________________________________________________
2.___________________________________________________________________
3.___________________________________________________________________
4.___________________________________________________________________
5.___________________________________________________________________
6.___________________________________________________________________
7.___________________________________________________________________
8.___________________________________________________________________
9.___________________________________________________________________
10.__________________________________________________________________
11.__________________________________________________________________
12.__________________________________________________________________
13.__________________________________________________________________
14.__________________________________________________________________
15.__________________________________________________________________
16.__________________________________________________________________
17.__________________________________________________________________
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Recognition Task
Please answer the following questions about Lakeview Lumber, Inc. by circling YES
if the item is in the case you have just read and by circling NO if the item is not in the
case you have just read.

Is the item in the case you just read?
1.

John Mosher, the Controller of Lakeview, was a former auditor of Lakeview.

Yes No

2.

Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” auditor for the current year Lakeview audit, has

already exceeded her audit time budget.
Yes No

3.

Lakeview gives its management stock options as an incentive to meet earnings.

Yes No

4.

The economic conditions are making account receivable collections less

difficult.
Yes No

5.

The majority of customers pay in cash.

Yes No

6.

Lakeview has some minor issues with its accounting system.

Yes No
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7.

Lakeview’s prior years’ financial statements were fairly presented.

Yes No

8.

Lakeview’s accounting controls may be susceptible to compromise and

override.
Yes No

9.

All audit samples were supported by proper documentation.

Yes No

10.

Adam Lester, the Manager of the Cabinets Department, did not keep detailed

records receiving reports, but merely forwarded them to Terry James, the Accounting
Manager.
Yes No
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Part IV –Post-Experimental
Q1. How interesting was this project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|

0

1

2

3

Not interesting at all

4

5

6

7

8

Moderately interesting

9

10

Very interesting

Q2. How much effort did you put into completing this project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|
0

1

2

3

Hardly any effort

4

5

6

7

8

Moderate amount of effort

9

10

A significant effort

Q3. How knowledgeable do you think you are in relation to the material presented in
this project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|
0

1

2

3

Very unknowledgeable

4

5

6

7

Moderately knowledgeable

Q4. What is your gender?
1. Male.
2. Female.

Q5. How old are you? ___________________
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8

9

10

Very knowledgeable

Q6. Do you have any qualification in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation or have
you attended training in this subject? Please select any that apply to you:
1. No previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training or degree.
2. Previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training.
3. Professional degree in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation.
4. Other certificates, for example: CPA, CMA, CIA, etc.
Q7. Please provide any comments that you may have about this study in the space
below._______________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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Appendix F - Questionnaire for the Low Risk Scenario
Note: In this Appendix F, the researcher used the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study to
measure the level of performance of the government auditors in fraud risk valuation
in Low Fraud Risk Scenario.
The case has been modified to reflect the Low Fraud Risk Scenario. However, the
reminaning instruments have been replicated as of the High Risk Scenario.

Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Assessment Questionnaire
This questionnaire is anonymous and aims to measure forensic accounting skills
amongst Dubai government auditors, as well as how they apply this skills during their
fraud risk assessment. It forms part of a larger Doctor of Business Administration
(DBA) project. The questionnaire is intended for Dubai government auditors. This
will help to ensure the findings from this project offer a fair representation of the
government auditors as a whole. All answers will be anonymous and should take
between 30 and 50 minutes to complete, depending on your answers.
Completing this questionnaire is voluntary and a decision not to participate will not
prejudice you in any way. If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue
participation at any time.
If you have any enquiries about the research, you can contact:
1. Abdulla Yaser Amiri- mobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email:
abdullaamiri@gmail.com.
2. Supervisors: 1. Dr. Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422;
email: munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae.
2. Dr. Tchan Latif, 009714/3900407;
email: Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae.
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If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has been
conducted, you can contact the Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee,
Office of Research, University of Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email rsoethics@uow.edu.au.
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Part I – Measuring Forensic Accounting Skills
This part aims to examine your litigation and investigative forensic accounting skills.

Litigation questions

1.

The forensic accountant’s work as an expert usually results in a written

report that typically includes all of the following except.
a) A plan for winning the case
b) A computation of the damages
c) The procedures followed in gathering information
d) The procedures followed in computing the damages

2.

The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be

introduced in court is:
a) The attorney or paralegal
b) A private detective
c) A fraud investigator
d) None of the above

3.

To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil

actions, the three basic elements that must be proven include all of the following
except:
a) Proximate cause
b) That damages were incurred with reasonable certainty
c) That fraud was committed by the defendant
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d) That lost profits were foreseeable at the time the wrongful act was
committed

4.

The crime of intentionally and permanently converting another's

property to one's own use is:
a) Burglary
b) Embezzlement
c) Robbery
d) Fraud

5.

SAS No.99, Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit,

requires that auditors report any evidence found that fraud may exist to which
of these?
a) Inventory accounts
b) Cash accounts
c) Financial reports
d) All of the above

6.

The fraud investigation process involves systematically gathering and

reviewing evidence for the purpose of
a) Providing proof in court that a fraud has been committed
b) Documenting the presence or absence of fraud
c) Satisfying the requirements of SAS 99
d) None of the above
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7.

Evidence is:
a) Useful in court only if the plaintiff and defendant can agree on its
admissibility
b) Allowed in court only if it is truthful
c) Most useful if it is relevant, reliable, and valid
d) Allowed if it passes the test of authenticity

8.

Which of the following is not a basic rule of handling evidence?
a) Keep documents in a secure location
b) Maintain appropriate chain of custody information
c) Handle original documents whenever possible
d) All of the above are basic rules of handling evidence

9.

Regarding the fraud investigation report, the investigator should:
a) Assume it will be challenged in court
b) Prepare a different report for the court
c) Assume that the investigation report will be protected under attorneyclient privilege.
d) None of the above

10.

The fraud reporting process can be defined as:
a) The process of submitting reports to authorities and insurance
companies
b) The process of documenting frauds committed
c) The process of informing affected stakeholders
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d) None of the above

Investigative questions
11.

In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the

following?
a) Uses auditing and other investigative skills
b) Prepares a written report that usually measures damages to an injured
party
c) Analyses what actually happened and develops assumptions about what
would have happened
d) All of the above

12.

The forensic accountant’s core investigative skills are:
a) Accounting and auditing skills
b) Advanced computer skills
c) Sophisticated statistical skills
d) Interviewing skills

13.

The advantages of going to the interviewee’s location is that:
a) Relevant documents are likely to be located there
b) Copies of documents can be made before the accountant leaves
c) The accountant may be directed to a co-worker at the same location for
additional information
d) All of the above apply
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14.

The primary objective in a fraud investigation should be to:
a) Stop the fraud from continuing
b) Make an example of the fraudster
c) Punish the fraudster
d) All of the above are possible primary objectives

15.

When should interviews normally be conducted?
a) Before documentary evidence is obtained
b) After a preliminary draft of the fraud investigation report is ready
c) Once a suspect can be identified
d) None of the above

16.

The correct order of questions to ask subjects who are not suspects is

best represented as:
a) Introductory, assessment, informational, and concluding
b) Introductory, informational, assessment, admission seeking, and
concluding
c) Introductory, informational, assessment, and admission seeking
d) Introductory, informational, assessment, and concluding

17.

During an interview, the interviewer should:
a) Never show anger
b) Never get angry
c) Never show anger or get angry
d) Get angry only if the crime is especially offensive
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18.

An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask:
a) "When was the first time you took money from the register?"
b) "You took the money because you needed to help your mother, didn’t
you?"
c) "You took the money, didn't you?"
d) All of the above are appropriate ways to accuse a suspect.

19.

When multiple persons are to be interviewed:
a)

Interview the least suspect persons first and then progress to the

most culpable.
b)

Interview them in a random order to reduce the likelihood of

bias.
c)

Interview the most suspect persons first and then progress to the

least suspect.
d)

20.

None of the above.

Subjects who are not guilty usually respond to assessment questions:
a) Slowly, carefully considering the questions and the implications of their
answers.
b) Without hesitation
c) Indirectly, so that the interviewer has more information
d) Reluctantly due to a desire to show kindness toward others
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Part II –– Case Scenario "The researcher have requested consent to use the case, and
the remaining parts of the instrument".
Background Information on Lakeview Lumber, Inc.
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. is located in the city of Lakeview, a metropolitan area of
approximately 200,000 people. Lakeview Lumber sells between 30,000 and 35,000
different kinds of building materials, lawn and garden products, and home improvement
supplies to retail customers, as well as to contractors and other building professionals.
Retail customers are required to pay in cash or by a major credit card at the time of their
purchase. However, the vast majority of contractors and building professionals have
established credit accounts and are billed on a monthly basis. Lakeview Lumber's main
competitors in the area are The Home Depot, Inc. and Eagle Hardware & Garden.
You as a government auditor are assigned to assist Karen Rohan, the “in-charge”
auditor on the FY2013 Lakeview Lumber audit.

Key Personnel
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.’s top management team consists of the following key
executives. Based on your firm’s prior interaction with these key executives, you have
some basic knowledge of their background.

John Mosher – Controller
•

John has been the Controller for Lakeview Lumber since 1995. He

usually arrives at work with an old car. He and his wife have recently been
saving money to remodel their old room.
Terry James – Accounting Manager
•

Terry has a B.A. in accounting and has been with Lakeview Lumber for
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four years. Prior to working for Lakeview Lumber, Terry was the night auditor
for a small hotel. Terry has extensive and detailed knowledge of the Lakeview
Lumber’s accounting systems as well as operational management.
Managerial Compensation
•

Lakeview Lumber, Inc. compensates its key personnel primarily through

a fixed salary schedule. In a recent board meeting, Lakeview’s board of
directors approved the motion to award all key personnel a cash bonus at the
end of each year, starting in FY2013. Key personnel will receive a cash bonus
based on the following: (1) salary rank (2) years of work. The cash bonus
should not exceed one percent of the individual’s salary.

Lakeview Lumber's Accounting Environment
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. appeared to have some minor weaknesses in its accounting
systems. However, they have a strong control over the company’s financial reporting
process. Their management reassured the auditors that they will maintain it.
Lakeview Lumber’s Audit
Karen, the current “in-charge” auditor is responsible for seeing that she completes the
field work for the Lakeview Lumber as soon as possible. Audit hours were already
over the time that had been budgeted for the job, and Karen believed that there was still
a substantial amount of time needed to finish the audit, because several audit matters
had not yet been resolved. Karen approached you with the following audit issues
regarding bad debts expense and product warranties expense for FY2013. She would
like you to review her analyses of these accounts and provide her with your
recommendations.
Bad Debts Expense
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Bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 4.7 percent for
FY2013, whereas in the prior two years bad debts expense as a percentage of credit
sales was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011. Credit sales for FY2013 were
about AED 2,600,000. Review and testing of the trail balance of Accounts Receivable
indicated that the amount and percentage of accounts receivable in each accounting
period were comparable to prior years.

The percentages used to estimate the

uncollectable accounts were reduced by almost half in practically category compared
to the previous year.
When Karen questioned Terry James, the Accounting Manager, about the decreased
percentages, he stated that John Mosher, the Controller, had instructed him to use the
lower percentages for FY2013. Karen subsequently discussed the matter with John,
who informed Karen that he was expecting customers to pay more quickly in FY2014,
due to a better than expected growth of the housing market in the area in which
Lakeview Lumber does business.
Product Warranties Expense
Lakeview Lumber's warranty expense account for FY2013 was approximately AED
118,000 representing a 4.4 percent increase from FY2012. Terry stated that the charge
to warranty expense was “just an estimate provided by John.” When Karen asked John
about the increase in warranty provisions, John stated that the increase was due to the
better than expected economic growth in the area. Adam stated while he did not keep
records of returns per se, he would fill out the appropriate paperwork and forward them
to the Accounting Department. Adam said he didn't think that the returns during
FY2013 were much different from those of FY2012. Karen subsequently asked Terry
from the Accounting Department to provide her with a complete list of returns for
FY2013.
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Karen sampled 30 transactions throughout FY2013. All of the sampled transactions
were supported by proper documentation.

Additional Analysis
In addition to the above information, Karen provided you with some preliminary
analysis of both the bad debts expense and the product warranties expense accounts
prepared by another audit staff member on the Lakeview audit.
The materiality level for the Lakeview Lumber, Inc. audit has been set to approximately
1.0 percent of the company’s reported sales. The materiality level for FY2013 was
AED 52,020.
Bad Debts Expense:
Amounts
Bad debts expense as

AED 122,200 AED 2,600,000 FY2013 credit sales x

currently recorded
Bad debts expense (if

Supporting calculations

4.7%
AED 130,000 AED 2,600,000 FY2008 credits sales x

applied the same percentage

5.0%

– 5.0% for both FY2012
and FY2011)
Potential understatement of
bad debts
Expense for FY2013

AED 7,800

AED 130,000 - AED 122,200

Less: income taxes (@

AED 2,964

AED 2,964 x 38%

AED 4,836

AED 7,800 - AED 2,964

38%)
Potential decrease to
currently recorded net
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income

Comment 1: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 4,836
due to the bad debts expense account.

Product Warranties Expense:
Amounts
Warranty expense as

Supporting calculations

AED 118,000

currently recorded
Warranty expense (if

AED 119,646

(1) FY 2011 warranty expense

applied the same percentage

percentage = warranty sales

- 2.3% for FY2012)

=113,000 /4,876,000 = 2.3%
(2) FY 2013 warranty = AED
5,202,000 x 2.3%

Potential understatement of
warranty
expense for FY2013

AED 1,646

AED 119,646 - AED 118,000

Less: income taxes (@

AED 625

AED 1,646 x 38%

AED 1,021

AED 1,646 - AED 625

38%)
Potential decrease to
currently recorded net
income

Comment 2: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 1,021
due to the product warranties expense account.
Comment 3: The combined effect of both the bad debts expense and the product
155

warranties expense accounts may have overstated the Lakeview Lumber Inc.'s net
income by AED 5,857 (AED 4,836 + AED 1,021).
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Lakeview Lumber's Financial Statements
Lakeview Lumber's income statements for the past three fiscal years are presented in
Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 includes the statements of retained earnings for FY2011 through
FY2013. The balance sheets for Lakeview Lumber for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013
are shown in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 1
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. Income Statements
(Amounts in thousands, except per share data)
FY2013

FY2012 FY2011

Unaudited

Audited Audited

(AED)

(AED)

(AED)

Sales

5,202

4,876

4,424

Cost of sales

3,451

3,359

3,101

Gross profit

1,751

1,517

1,323

Depreciation

184

174

169

Bad debts expense

122

125

118

Warranty expense

118

113

117

Other selling expense

575

465

342

Total selling expense

999

877

746

expenses

235

224

251

Total expenses

1,234

1,101

961

Income before tax

517

416

362

Income taxes

196

158

138

Net income

321

258

224

Earnings per share

3.21

2.58

2.24

General & administrative
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EXHIBIT 2
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. Statements of Retained Earnings
(Amounts in thousands)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2010

AED 1,735

FY2011 (Audited)
Add: net income

224

Less: dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2011

AED 1,859

FY2012 (Audited)
Add: net income

258

Less: dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2012

AED2,017

FY2013 (Unaudited)
Add: net income

321

Less: dividends

(100)

Retained earnings @ end of FY2013

AED ,238

End of Company Information
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Now that you have finished reviewing the information pertaining to Lakeview Lumber,
Inc., Karen would like to have you provide her with the following assessment:

Based on your evaluation of Lakeview, please rank the extent of your agreement with
the following statement on the scale below.

Q1: The Lakeview Bad Debt Expense account was fairly presented. Place an “X” at
the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly disagree

5

6

7

8

Neither

9

10

Strongly

disagree or agree

agree

Q2: How likely would you do the following in regard to the Lakeview Bad Debt
Expense account? Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Not likely at all to take further

5

6

7

8

Somewhat likely

9

10

Very likely

action to investigate
this account

Q3: The Lakeview Product Warranties Expense account was fairly presented. Place
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

Strongly disagree

3

4

5

6

Neither disagree or agree
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7

8

9

10

Strongly agree

Q4: How likely are you to do the following in regard to the Lakeview Product
Warranties Expense account? Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the
scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Not likely at all to take further

5

6

7

8

Somewhat likely

9

10

Very likely

action to investigate
this account

Q5: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber, Inc.,
how likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview’s Bad Debt Expense account? Place
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

2

3

4

Very unlikely

5

6

7

8

Moderate

9

10

Very likely

Q6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how
likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview's Product Warranties Expense account?
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

Very unlikely

2

3

4

5

6

Moderate
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7

8

9

10

Very likely

Q7: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., what
is your assessment of the overall fraud risk for this client? Place an “X” at the
appropriate place on the scale below.
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|
0

1

Very low

2

3

4

5

6

Moderate
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7

8

9

10

Very high

Part III – Recall Task
In the space provided below please list all of the important information that you can
remember about Lakeview Lumber Inc. Write down the information in the order
that you remember it. Start a new line for each piece of information.
1.___________________________________________________________________
2.___________________________________________________________________
3.___________________________________________________________________
4.___________________________________________________________________
5.___________________________________________________________________
6.___________________________________________________________________
7.___________________________________________________________________
8.___________________________________________________________________
9.___________________________________________________________________
10.__________________________________________________________________
11.__________________________________________________________________
12.__________________________________________________________________
13.__________________________________________________________________
14.__________________________________________________________________
15.__________________________________________________________________
16.__________________________________________________________________
17.__________________________________________________________________
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Recognition Task
Please answer the following questions about Lakeview Lumber, Inc. by circling YES
if the item is in the case you have just read and by circling NO if the item is not in the
case you have just read.
Is the Item in the case you just read?
1.

John Mosher, the Controller of Lakeview, was a former auditor of Lakeview.

Yes No

2.

Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” auditor for the current year Lakeview audit, has

already exceeded her audit time budget.
Yes No

3.

Lakeview gives its management stock options as an incentive to meet earnings.

Yes No

4.

The economic conditions are making account receivable collections less

difficult.
Yes No

5.

The majority of customers pay in cash.

Yes No

6.

Lakeview has some minor issues with its accounting system.

Yes No
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7.

Lakeview’s prior years financial statements were fairly presented.

Yes No

8.

Lakeview’s accounting controls may be susceptible to compromise and

override.
Yes No

9.

All audit samples were supported by proper documentation.

Yes No

10.

Adam Lester, the Manager of the Cabinets Department, did not keep detailed

records receiving reports, but merely forwarded them to Terry James, the Accounting
Manager.

Yes No
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Part IV –Post-Experimental
Q1. How interesting was this project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|

0

1

2

3

4

Not interesting at all

5

6

7

8

9

Moderately interesting

10
Very interesting

Q2. How much effort did you put into completing this project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|
0

1

2

3

Hardly any effort

4

5

6

7

8

Moderate amount of effort

9

10

A significant effort

Q3. How knowledgeable do you think you are with the material presented in this
project?
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|
0

1

2

3

Very unknowledgeable

4

5

6

7

8

Moderately knowledgeable

Q4. What is your gender?
1. Male.
2. Female.

Q5. How old are you? ___________________
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9

10

Very knowledgeable

Q6. Do you have any qualification in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation or any
training in this subject? Please select any that apply to you:
1. No previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training or degree.
2. Previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training.
3. Professional degree in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation.
4. Other certificates, for example: CPA, CMA, CIA, etc.

Q7. Please provide any comments that you may have about this study in the space
below._______________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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